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REVISED ARTICLE 9, SECURITIZATION TRANSACTIONS 

AND THE BANKRUPTCY DYNAMIC• 

LOIS R. LUPICA•• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.")1 is the law governing the 
creation, perfection, and enforcement of security interests in personal property. 
Originally enacted in 1960,2 Article 9 was substantially revised in 1972 in response 
to changes in commercial financing markets and practices3 Since this last revision, 
there have been further changes, including technological advances, affecting 
commercial practice and custom4 These changes have led the Permanent Editorial 
Board for the U.C.C. ("PEB") to recommend to the American Law Institute ("ALI") 
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
("NCCUSL") that Article 9, once again, be significantly revised.5 The stated reason 
for the current revisions is to ensure that Article 9 keeps pace with changes in 
commercial financing practices, thereby offering enhanced certainty to the 
• CO Lois R. Lupica 200 I . 
.. Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. B.S. 1981, Cornell University; J.D. 
1987, Boston University School of Law. Many thanks to David Nowlin, Laura O'Hanlon, Jennifer Wriggins, 
and especially Thomas M. Ward, for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Thanks also to 
Kevan Lee Rinehart, University of Maine School of Law, Class of2001, for excellent research assistance. 
1 Article 9 of the Unifonn Conunercial Code ("U.C.C."}, as currently in effect, will be referred to in this 
Article as ..Anicle 9" or "Current Article 9." The revised version of Article 9, as approved by the National 
Conference of Commissioners ofUnifonn State Law ("NCCUSL") and the American Law Institute ("ALI") 
on July 30, 1998, will be referred to as "Revised Article 9," and the specific Code provisions as e.g., 
"Revised Section 9-318." 
2 See PEB Study Group, Pennanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 (Dec. 1, 
1992) [hereinafter '"PEB Study"). · 
3 Id. at 1-2. See also Aaron Chambers, Lawmakers Modernize Transactions Law, 146 CHI. DAILY L. 
BULL. 1 (2000) (pointing out that before J998 revisions, "the UCC's Secured Transactions Article ... was 
last overhauled in 1972''). 
4 See PES Study, supra note 2, at 2; see also Chambers, supra note 3, at l ("The revision is designed to 
bring Article 9 into the 21st century. According to the NCCUSL, the volume of commerce and credit has 
increased exponentially, as have electronic transactions, but Article 9 had not been modified to reflect those 
changes."); Alan M. Christenfeld & Shephard W. Melzer, Get Ready for the New Article 9, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 2, 
1997, at 5 (''The UCC was adopted long before modem capital markets developed now-common techniques 
for securitizing streams of payment arising from assets Other than accounts receivable."). 
' As stated in the Official Comment to § 9-10 I, Short title: 
In 1990, the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC with the support of its sponsors, The 
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
established a committee to study Ar1icle 9 of the UCC. The study committee issued its report as of 
December I, 1992, recommending the creation of a drafting committee for the revision of Article 
9 and also recoiTUllCndiog numerous specific changes to Article 9. Organized in 1993, a drafting 
committee met fifteen times from 1993 to 1998. This Article was approved by its sponsors in 
1998. 
Rev. U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 2. 
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commercial fmancing markets6 Among the changes made to Article 9 are a 
collection of substantive revisions to the rules affecting a relatively new financing 
method, known as securitization.7 
Securitization, or structured financing, is a process whereby a debtor raises 
funds through the sale and repackaging of certain assets. 8 A firm can originate a 
securitization transaction only if it has earnings in the form of cash flow from long­
or medium- term obligations owed to it by account debtors.9 In a securitization 
transaction, the securitizing firm sells its cash flows to a Special Purpose 
Corporation, commonly referred to as an SPC. 10 The SPC in turn, transforms these 
cash flows into securities, and sells the securities, backed by the cash flows (asset­
backed securities or ABS), to private or public investors.u 
Debtors securitize their assets, in lieu of using them as collateral for secured 
loans, when they perceive that securitization offers them advantages not available 
through alternative methods of financing. 12 These advantages, from the debtor's 
perspective, range from improved liquidity, 13 the opportunity to attain diversified 
funding sources,14 improve risk management,15 accounting-related benefits,16 and 
lowering its own effective interest expenses. 17 
fl See Steven 0. Weise, An Overview of Revised UCC Article 9, in THE NEW ARTICLE 9 UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE (Corinne Coopered, 2d ed. 1999). Steven 0. Weise was the American Bar Association 
Advisor to the Article 9 Drafting Committee. See also C. Scott Ptyor, Revised Uniform Commercial Code 
Article 9: Impact in Bankruptcy, 7 AM. BANKR. !NST. L. REv. 465,467 (1999) (outlining Revised Article 9's 
"three broad areas of change"). 
7 Rev. U.C.C. § 9-l02(a)(2) (redefining "account"); id. § 9-l02(a)(6l) (defining new term "payment 
intangible"); id. § 9-l02(a)(64) (expanding definition of"proceeds"); id. § 9-l02(a)(65) (defining new term 
"promissory note"); id. § 9-109(a)(3) (providing that Article 9 now governs sale of accounts, chattel paper, 
payment intangibles, and promissory notes); id. § 9-204(a), (c) (expressly validating after acquired property 
and future advances in a securitization context); id. § 9-318 (making explicit that seller of an account, chattel 
paper, payment intangible or promissory note retains no interest in such asset); id. §§ 9-406, 9-408 
(eliminating restrictions on transfer ofcertain assets). 
8 See generally JAMES A. ROSENTHAL & JUAN M. OCAMPO, SECURITIZATION OF CREDIT: INSIDE THE 
NEW TECHNOWGY OF FINANCE 3 (1988) (describing securitization as one method of finance); 
SECURITIZATION OF FrNANCIAL ASSETS (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000) (explaining the 
structure of securitization transactions). 
9 See ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra note 8, at 3. 
10 See id. 
11 See id This Article will asswne the following prototype: the originator is a cotporation, its securitized 
assets are a form of receivables and the SPC is a corporate subsidiary of the originator, fanned exclusively 
for the pwpose of purchasing the originator's receivables and issuing asset-backed securities. 
12 See Bankroptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part III): Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the Subcomm. on 
Commercial & Admin. Law, l06th Cong. 6-7 (1999) [hereinafter Leach Testimony] (testimony of Rep. 
James A. Leach, Chairman, House Banking and Financial Services Committee) (listing benefits of 
securitization), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/leac3l7.htm. 
13 See Glenn B. McClelland, Jr. & James W. McDonald, Jr., Securitizing Trade and Lease Receivables, in 
THE ASSET SECURITIZATION HANDBOOK 123, !30 (Phillip L. Zweig ed., 1989) (discussing how 
securitization enables finn to more efficiently manage its cash requirements and expenses). 
14 Securitization has been described as "socially useful in that it may reduce the cost of obtaining cash by 
making it easier for our [sic] certain borrowers to access public markets." The Business Bankruptcy Reform 
Act: Hearing on S. 1914 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts, 105th Cong. 67 (1998) 
[hereinafter Picker Testimony] (testimony of Randal C. Picker) (citing The Bond Market Trade Association, 
Letter to Senator Grassley, April3, 199&), available at WL 12760356. 
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The opportunity for lower financing costs, relative to secured financing, 
provides a central motivation for many securitizing firms. The financing is cheaper 
because of the originator's potential to transfer the securitized assets beyond the 
reach of the originator's bankruptcy trustee. 18 Accordingly, upon an originator's 
bankruptcy, under most circumstances the holders of the securitized assets are not 
required to participate in the originator's bankruptcy proceeding, and such assets 
cannot be used in the originator's efforts to reorganize. 19 Because the risks 
associated with the originator's bankruptcy are effectively eliminated for the asset­
backed security investor, these investors can offer funding at a lower rate than a 
15 See ROSENTHAL & OcAMPO, supra note 8, at 12 (describing how investors in asset-backed securities 
are insulated from credit risk of originator); see also Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankntptcy 
Process: The Statutory Institutionalization ofSecuritization, 33 CONN. L. REV. 199,200 {2000} [hereinafter 
Lupica, Circumvention] (explaining that one main reason firms securitize their assets is benefit of improved 
risk management). 
16 Harold H. Goldberg eta!., Asset Securitization and Corporate Financial Health, J. APPLIED CORP. FlN., 
Fall 1988, at 49. Recent rules on the subject of sale versus loan for accounting purposes, promulgated by the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board state: 
A transfer of financial assets (or all or a ponion of a financial asset) in which the 
transferor surrenders control over those financial assets shall be accounted for as a sale 
to the extent that consideration other than beneficial interests in the transferred assets is 
received in exchange. The transferor has surrendere<i control over transferred assets if 
and only if all of the following conditions are met: 
a. The transferred assets have been isolated from the transferor - put 
preswnably beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in 
bankruptcy or other receiverships .... 
b. Either (1) each transferee obtains the right - free of conditions that 
constrain it from taking advantage of that right ... - to pledge or exchange 
the transferred assets or (2) the transferee is a qualifying special-purpose 
entity ... and the holders of beneficial interest in that entity have the right­
free of conditions that constrain them from taking advantage of that right ... 
-to pledge or exchange those interests. · 
c. The transferor does not maintain effective control over the transferred 
assets through (I) an agreement that both entitles and obligates the transferor 
to repurchase or redeem them before their maturity ... or (2) an agreement 
that entitles the transferor to repurchase or redeem transferred assets that are 
not readily obtainable .... 
STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 125, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of 
Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities 3-4 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1996). 
17 See Goldberg et al., supra note 16, at 50 (stating that securitization has become so popular because it is 
less expensive than tradition methods of finance). See generally ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra note 8, at 8­
23 (outlining securitization's benefits to originators). 
18 See ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra note 8, at 8-23~ see also Leach Testimony, supra note 12, at 6-7; 
Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor's Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REV. 595, 613-14 
(1998) (hereinafter Lupica, Asset Securitization] (noting that because securitizing originators are in better 
position to manage ''event risks," firms can fund operations at lower effective interest rate); Lisa A Tibbitts, 
Learning the Basics, Issuers Prepare for Securitization, Standard & Poor's Structured Finance, at 
http://www .standardandpoors. com/ratings/ structuredfinance/17 3 535f.htm. 
• 
19 See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text (discussing extent to which securitized assets are not 
deemed part of originator's bankruptcy estate). 
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comparable lender would charge in a secured financing. 20 Thus, the investors take 
less risk; the originator gets cheaper credit. 
Not everyone benefits from the risk reducing and cost saving formulation, 
however." While securitization reduces the risk ofnon-payment for ABS investors, 
it increases the risk of non-payment for unsecured creditors of the originator." This 
consequence becomes exacerbated when the originator files for bankruptcy." Once 
a ftrm has securitized a portion of its assets, upon a liquidation, fewer 
unencumbered assets may be included in the debtor's bankruptcy estate for the 
benefit of the debtor's residual creditors.24 Moreover, a bankruptcy debtor who has 
securitized its assets may have a diminished ability to reorganize due to the dearth 
of cash collatera1.25 
20 See ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra note 8, at 8-23; see also Nicole Chu, Note, Bowie Bonds: A Key to 
Unlocking. the Wealth of Intellectual Property, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 469,498 (1999) (stating 
that "[s]ecuritization has been a boon to ... borrowers seeking to lower their cost of funds by broadening 
their access to capital markets; investment bankers generating income by underwriting, making markets in. 
and trading asset-backed securities"); Lupica, Circumvention, supra note 15, 201 (noting that proposed 
change in Bankruptcy Code would grant super-priority of payment to exclusive class of asset-backed 
security investors). 
21 See generally Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 18 (describing impact securitization can have on 
securitizing originator's unsecured creditors); Lupica, Circumvention, supra note 15, at 225·30 (outlining 
consequences of Article 9 revisions and proposed amendment to Bankruptcy Code on securitizing 
or~inators and their other creditors). 
See Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 18, at 634 ("Not surprisingly, the securitizing fum's 
unsecured creditors are asswning a risk of nonpayment, as a result of the securitization, that is arguably 
greater than the risk unsecured creditors experience when their debtor borrows money on a secured basis."); 
Lupica, Circumvention, supra note 15, at 232-36 (discussing diminished chance of unsecured creditor 
r~ayment).
3 See Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 18, at 621-623; see also Bankruptcy Reform Act of /999 
(Part Ill): Hearing an H.R. 833 Brifore the Subcamm. on Commercial & Admin. Law, 106th Cong. 89 (1999) 
[hereinafter Tatelbaum Testimony] (testimony of Charles M. Tatelbaum on behalf of The National 
Association of Credit Managers) (stating that removal of secwitized assets from debtor's bankruptcy estate 
"will have an adverse impact on other classes of creditors. This will have a chilling effect on Americas trade 
credit grantors in the day to day extension of credit, b)r removing any potential for recovery in the event of 
default."), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/l 06-tate.hbn. 
24 See KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND fORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 101 
(1997) (discussing bow viewing bankruptcy process from "strongest and most powerful" creditors' 
perspective "addresses only a limited number of those affected by a bankruptcy filing. It fails to take into 
account the myriad parties touched by a bankruptcy case and the economic consequences of their 
situations."); see also Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 18, at 624 (noting that "a further objective of a 
securitizing originator is to remove its securitized assets from its potential bankruptcy estate"). 
"See In re Dynaco Corp., 162 B.R. 389, 393 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993) ("Debtors seeking to reorganize under 
chapter 1 J of the Bankruptcy Code frequently need to use their cash and proceeds therefrom in order to 
continue with their business operations."); In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143, 147·51 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) 
(recognizing necessity of debtor's use of cash collateral rents in first months following bankruptcy in order to 
conduct its business dwing reorganization effort); In re Greenwood Bldg. Supply, Inc., 23 B.R 720, 721 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo 1982) ("The evidence shows that debtor could not reorganize without the use of cash 
collateraL"); Sun Bank/Suncoast v. Earth Lite, Inc. (In re Earth Lite, Inc.), 9 B.R. 440, 443 (Bankr. M.D. Fla 
1981) ("[I]t is evident that if a Debtor who seeks relief under chapter II is deprived of the use of cash, its 
chances to secure rehabilitation are immediately destroyed and very few, if any, entities could survive and 
effectuate a reorganization without cash."); see also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part II): Hearing on 
H.R. 833 Before ih" Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law, 106th Cong. 46-58 (1999) (hereinafter Klee 
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' Historically, there has been a strong bankruptcy policy of promoting the 
reorganization of viable businesses.26 This policy is premised on the idea that an 
enterprise worth more "alive than dead," is worth preserving for the benefit of the 
debtor, and offers a greater benefit to the debtor's creditors, employees, suppliers, 
and customers, compared to a liquidation proceeding. 27 If a securitizing debtor finds 
itself without the cash necessary to sustain itself while it is formulating a 
reorganization plan, then a reorfanization may not be tenable - leaving liquidation 
as the debtor's only alternative? 
This Article will examine the Article 9 revisions affecting securitization, 
particularly in light of the revisions' impact upon the bankruptcy dynamic. Part II 
of this Article describes securitization's history and its impact on and place in the 
commercial credit markets. Part III outlines some of the issues and problems that 
have been faced by securitizing originators and asset-backed security purchasers 
under Current Article 9. Part IV analyzes the revisions made to Article 9 affecting 
securitization transactions. Part V explains securitization's distributive effects and 
explores the impact that a further proliferation of securitization will have on the 
bankruptcy dynamic. Part VI describes the proposed amendment to the Bankruptcy 
Code affecting securitization and examines its potential impact. Part VII concludes 
by speculating about the extent to which Revised Article 9's provisions affecting 
securitization will meet the goals of the drafters and the expectations of the various 
participants in the commercial credit markets. 
II. SECURITIZATION 
Since the first public asset-backed security issuance,29 the volume of ABS 
issuances has grown from $1 billion in 1985 to $185 billion in 1999.30 There are 
Testimony] (testimony of Kenneth K.lee on behalf of The National Bankruptcy Conference), available at 
hrw://www.house.gov/judiciary/l 06-k.lee.htm; Tatelbaum Testimony, supra note 23, at 89. 
6 See Gathering Rest. Inc. v. First Nat1 Bank of Valparaiso, 79 B.R 992,998 (In reGathering Rest., Inc.), 
79 B.R. 992, 996 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986) (stating that "[a)t the beginning of the reorganization process. the 
Court mwt work with less evidence than might be desirable and should resolve issues in favor of the 
reorganization, where the evidence is conflicting"); id. at 999 (stating that "(i]n the context of a bankruptcy 
case ... the public interest ... means the promoting of a successful reorganization which should be one of 
the paramount concerns of a bankruptcy court"). 
21 See GROSS, supra note 24, at 101. But see in reGathering Rest. Inc., 79 B.R. at 998 (noting that when 
deciding to grant preliminary injunction to debtor, one must weigh probability of success of reorganization 
and therefore, "worth more alive than dead" theory depends on court's belief of successful reorganization). 
28 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
29 Sperry Corporation originated the ftrst non-real estate-related public securitization in 1985. This 
issuance was fo11owed by General Motors Acceptance Corporation securitization in 1986. Lowen L. Bryan, 
Structured Securitized Credit: A Superior Technology for Lending, J.APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 1988, at lO­
lL 
30 The 1999 volume was based upon an annualized projection of the volume from the first nine months 
of 1999. It has been said that the securitization market is the most rapidly increasing segment 
of the capital markets. Bernadette Minton et aL, Asset Securitization Among industrial Firms, 3 
(November 1997) (investigating why industrial fmns use asset-backed securities market), at 
http://.www.timopler.com/opler/absabs.htm. 
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over $2.5 trillion asset-backed securities currently outstanding," and it has be\:m 
estimated that a typical business day sees $700 million in new ABS issuances. 32 The 
range of types of assets that can be securitized has similarly expanded33 and recent 
assets securitized have included health care receivables, airline ticket receivables, 
film production and distribution receivables, recreational vehicle loans, equipment 
leases, and automobile leases.34 
As "one of the most significant financial innovations in· the global capital 
markets during the past 15 years," securitization continues to "evolve and 
expand."35 Rating agencies, charged with the responsibility of evaluating asset 
quality, 36 have noted that securitization's attractiveness to investors has not 
waned,37 and it has been said that this attractiveness is attributed to the high quality 
and stability of the issued assets.38 
The long-term attractiveness of the ABS vehicle to investors, however, turns 
upon the extent of the isolation of these assets from the credit risk of the originator. 
The extent of the securitized assets' isolation from the originator in tum, depends 
31 See Gary Silverman et al., A $2.5 Trillion Market You Hardly Know, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1998, at 122. 
32 Minton et al., supra note 30, at 3. 
33 See genera/Jy Structured Finance Legal Criteria, Standard & Poor's Strucnued Finance [hereinafter 
Structured Finance], at http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/structuredfinance/index.htm. 
34 See Suzanne Woolley & Stan Crock, You Can Securitize Virtually Everything, Bus. WK., July 20, 1992, 
at 78; Standard & Poor's: US. Legal Criteria in Structured Finance Transactions, April 2000, at 
http://www.standardandpoors.comlratings/structu.red.financelindex.htm; see also Lupica,. Asset 
Securitization, supra note 18, at 602-03 (listing examples of the array of asset categories currently being 
securitized); Kim Clark, On the Frontier of Creative Finance How Wall Street Can Securitize Anything, 
FORTIJNE, April27, 1997, at 50 (describing trends in securitization); Michael Gregory, S.G. Cowen Brings 
First Rights Deal, ASSET SALES REPORT, March 13, 2000 (describing securitization of sports stad.iwn 
naming rights contract); Adam Reinebach, The Outlook for ABS Is so Rosy That It's Scary; New Asset 
Categories, New Players, New Regions are Proliferating, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., June l, 1998, at 26 
[hereinafter Reinebach, Outlook for ABS] (describing securitization of intellectual property futures, utility 
losses, reinsurance risk); Adam Reinebach, As Franchise Loan Industry Expands, Securitization Deals are 
Following; Pool ofReceivables May Widen to Include GolfCourse, Movie Theatres, INVESTMENT DEALERS' 
DIG., May II, 1998, at 13 [hereinafter Reinebach, Franchise Loan] (forecasting franchise asset class will 
significantly expand in the next yCars); Matthew Schifrin & Howard Rudnitsky, Rx for Receivables, FORBES; 
May 6, 1996, at 52 (describing securitization of pharmaceutical receivables); Ron Feldman, Will the 
Securitization Revolution Spread?, THE REGION, Sept. 1995 (discussing small business loans), at 
h~://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.uslpubslregionlreg959b.html (last visited March 30, 2001). 
5 Standard & Poor's: U.S. Asset-Backed Securities Market Will Continue Expansion, Feb. 10, 2000, 
available at http://www.pmewswire.com. 
36 Rating agencies research and evaluate the quality of securities issuances and publish what are known as 
credit ratings. See Paul M. Shupack, On Boundaries andDefinitions: A Commentary On Dean Baird, 80 VA. 
L. REV. 2273, 2296-97 (1994) [hereinafter Shupack, Boundaries] (commenting how AAA/aaa ratings and 
top ratings are impacted by cash collateral and automatic stay provisions of Bankruptcy Code); Francis A. 
Bottini, Jr., Comment, An Examination ofthe Current Status ofRating Agencies and Proposals for Limited 
Oversight of Such Agencies, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 579, 61 I (1993) (discussing regulation of rating 
agencies). 
37 See Shane Kite, Insider's Predictions Point to Maturing Market, ASSET SALES REPORT, Oct. 18, 1999, 
available at 1999 WL 25988030; Akil Salim Roper, ABS Market Expected to Grow in 1999, PRIVATE 
PLACEMENT LEITER, Feb. 8, 1999, available al 1999 WL 17487406; U.S. Asset-Backed Securities Market 
Will Continue Expansion, supra note 35;. 
38 The Investor Perspective: The Benefits of Buying Securitized Bonds, Standard & Poor's Structured 
·Finance, at http://www .standardandpoors.com/ratings/structuredfinance/1 =73543f.htm. 
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upon the efficacy of the transaction's structure. The strength of any transaction's 
structure is a product of a targeted and well developed legal system; one that has 
contemplated that transaction's volume and structure. Seeing that the legal regime 
governing securitization has been outpaced by the growth of the securitization 
market, legal protection against the credit risk of the originator, used as a selling 
point to ABS investors, may in fact, be "oversold. "39 
There is little case law addressing legal issues raised by securitizations. Likely 
due to the market's relative youth, there have not been many bankruptcies of 
securitizing originators. Therefore, courts have not had the opportunity to carefully 
scrutinize these transactions' structures. As stated in Congressional testimony 
concerning proposed Bankruptcy Code revisions affecting securitization: 
[the issues of] the possible harm to the bankruptcy estate and other 
creditors that may result from securitized financings. . . are 
unresolved, because there have been almost no cases addressing the 
consequences of securitization in bankruptcy. There are a handful 
of unreported opinions and almost no reported opinions. We are not 
learning, because we are not litigating. Usually, judicial 
development of an area gives us a full sense of the issues raised by 
any new practice. It is the interaction of case law and legislation 
that is the genius of the American system ... 40 
39 
"In terms of credit risk, the word 'bankruptcy remote' is sounding thinner and thinner, say insiders, as 
most feel the legal protection offered to bond investors from an issuing company's credit troubles has been 
oversold." Kite, supra note 37. See also Suzanne Woolley, What's Next, Bridge Tolls? Almost Any Risk Can 
Be Securitized- But Quality May Be ijfy, Bus. WK., Sept. 2, 1996, at 64 (quoting rating agency managing 
director urging caution to ABS investors). Moreover, there have been other criticisms of securitization 
leveled by industry observers. See Frederic Darmen, The Failed Promise of Asset-Backed Securities, 
INSTITIJTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 1989, at 260 (observing that market prices for ABS have not always been 
accurate reflection of their credit-enhanced quality); Silverman et al., supra note 31 (observing "illusion of 
liquidity" in ABS rimrket which is leading to more expensive credit for originators, who in tiun are passing 
higher costs on to conswners); Gary Silverman, Securitization is No Security Blanket, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 
1998, at 140 (noting that certain financial institutions are securitizing their higher quality loans, and keeping 
the risky ones, thereby ~king their risk of insolvency). Securitization's bankruptcy risk are not confined to 
the issue of whether the securitized assets were completely removed from the originator's bankruptcy estate. 
See, e.g., In re Kingston Square Assocs., 214 B.R. 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (concerning creditors who 
filed involuntary bankruptcy petition against SPC, thereby threatening ABS investors' interests). One case 
where strucrured finance collapsed in bankruptcy was Towers Financial. In the Towers case, the originator 
and five SPCs filed for bankruptcy protection, resulting in substantial losses for Tower's ABS investors. See 
Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin (In re Towers Fin. Corp. Noteholders Litig.), 
No. 93 Civ 0810, 1998 WL 93337 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1998). But see In re Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., No 
1-90-00130, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 392 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio, Jan. 10, 1992) (showing court's respect of 
bankruptcy remote structure of transaction); In re Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., No. LA 91-64140 JD, 
1991 Bankr. LEXIS 2186 (Bankr. C.D. Cal., July 30, 1991) (same). 
40 Picker Testimony, supra note 14, at 67-68. Professor Picker was referring in his testimony to a Senate 
Subcommittee on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference, to a proposed modification of the 
definition of bankruptcy "estate" found in§ 541 of the Bankruptcy Code. The proposed language addition to 
§ 541 states that "eligible assets" transferred by the debtor in a securitization are affmnatively deemed to be 
excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Professor Picker testified: 
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The industry is anticipating that in the coming years there will be significant 
developments in the case law, addressing many of the open questions concerning a 
securitization's distributive effects, as well as securitization's impact in bankruptcy. 
The next years will prove the wisdom of urging caution with respect to changes in 
the law that further encourage and facilitate securitization transactions. 
III. CURRENT ARTICLE 9 AND SECURITIZATION 
Article 9 of the U.C.C. is the legal system governing secured transactions, 
which by definition, includes the sale of accounts41 and chattel paper.42 When 
Current Article 9 was originally enacted, the securitization market, as currently 
constituted, was not within the contemplation of the drafters. While Current Article 
9 does include within its scope the governance of the common commercial practice 
of account-based financing, including factoring, 43 the variety of assets currently 
securitized coupled with the complexity of the transactions, leaves many 
9.44securitizations beyond the reach of Article The rapid evolution of the 
securitization market has done much to reveal many of the gaps and weaknesses of 
Article 9; in this regard, Article 9 has not been achieving its goal of providing 
certainty and consistency to commercial financing markets. 45 
This provision is highly objectionable. T1le current existence of a robust asset 
securitization business, coupled with the existence of minimal case law in the area, 
strongly suggest that special Bankruptcy Code treatment is unnecessary. The broad 
definition of''transferred" is likely to cause certain financing arrangements to be treated 
as sales to prevent the debtor's assets from being considered property of the estate even 
through they are only pledged as collateral. The proposed provision makes no effort to 
distinguish those transactions properly characterized as "true sales" from those 
legitimately subject to characterization as security interests. 
Id. at 92. See infra notes 159-190 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the proposed changes 
to the Bankruptcy Code and their impact on securitization. 
41 Accounts are currently defined in Article 9 as "any right to payment for goods Sold or leased or for 
services rendered, which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or not it. has been 
earned by perfonnance." U.C.C. § 9-106 (1995). See also Dan T. Coenen, Priorities in Accounts: The Crazy 
Quilt of Current Law and a Proposal for Reform. 45 VAND. L. REv. 1061. 1066-67 (1992) (discussing 
defmition of "account"). Current Article 9 recognizes that the distinction between asset sales and assets 
transferred as collaterdl was often blurred in practice, and as such, a distinction between the two was not 
made in the statute. Current Article 9 governs both the sale of accounts and chattel paper as well as security 
interests in these assets for purpose of its notice requirement. See U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(b) (1995) (setting forth 
policy and subject matter ofArticle 9). 
42 Chattel paper is defined as "a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and a 
security interest in or a lease of specific goods ..." U.C.C. § 9-105 (l)(b) (1995). 
43 See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1995) (stating "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in Section 9-104 on excluded 
transactions, this Article applies ... to any sale of accounts or chattel paper". Secwitization's roots are found 
in the ancient financing method known as factoring. Factoring originated in the 14th century English textile 
industry. Factoring is the discounted sale of accounts to a third party. Commonly, the factor both purchases 
the accounts, and analyzes the account debtor's credit. See also SUSAN CRICHTON & CHARLES FERRIER, 
UNDERSTANDING FACTORJNG AND TRADE CREDIT 7-9, 22-26 (1986) (describing roots of securitization). 
44 See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 

45 See infra notes 46--66 and accompanying text. 
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The problem is readily illustrated. Where a transaction falls within Article 9's 
scope, the rights and obligations of the parties upon default are clear and 
straightforward. If a transferee of assets in an Article 9-governed transaction has 
complied with Article 9's attachment and perfection rules, the transferee is deemed 
secured and is therefore entitled to priority over all of the debtor's unsecured 
creditors, as well as to priority over subsequent judgment creditors, secured parties 
and lien creditors with competing claims to the assets 46 Conversely, if a transferee 
fails to perfect its interest in transferred assets, its interest may be defeated by a 
. & 47 
subsequent, competmg trans,eree. 
When, however, a financing transaction is governed not by Article 9, but by an 
amalgam of state common law and remnants of non-uniform accounts receivable 
statutes, the rules are not as clear. Accordingly, the parties may not be certain of 
their rights and obligations, and the efficiency of the transactions is compromised.48 
The problem is magnified by the abstruseness of the characterization and 
classification issue surrounding securitized assets. For example, if an originator 
seeks to securitize a payment stream from the licensing of intellectual property, the 
first step is to determine whether the payment stream is an "account," or falls within 
the residual category of "general intangibles." If the licensing receivable is an 
"account," then its sale is governed by Article 9. If it is a "general intangible," 
Article 9 governs its transfer as collateral for a loan, but not its sale in connection 
with a securitization. If the parties make an erroneous decision as to the 
receivables' classification, upon default, they may find themselves unperfected, and 
thus their interest vulnerable to defeat by a party with a superior interest. 
The confusion is heightened when an asset's characterization is determined to 
be incorrect and there is also a faulty characterization of the transfer. For example, 
an intended sale may be found to be a transfer of collateral rather than an asset 
. "U.C.C § 9-30l(l)(b) (1995) states: . 
(I) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected security interest is 
subordinate to the rights of ... 
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected; 
/d. 
The most common competitor is likely to be the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy. The trustee is granted, 
pursuant to§ 544 of the Bankruptcy Code, all of the rights of a hypothetical creditor with a state law lien on 
the debtor's property. Read together, § 544 and § 9-30l(l){b) of the U.C.C. grant the bankruptcy trustee 
priority in the unperfected transferred property. See ll U.S.C. § 544 (1994) (providing "[tlrustee as lien 
creditor and as successor to certain creditors and purchasers"). If the transferred property is in the hands of a 
third party, § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code grants the trustee the power to recover such property for the 
benefit of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Once the property is returned to the debtor's estate, it then becomes 
available for the pro rata distribution to debtor's unsecured creditors. See II U.S. C. §§ 542, 550 {1994). 
47 See U.C.C. § 9-30l(l)(b) (1995). 
& If the appropriate governing law is identified, and the proper non· Article 9 steps to perfect, if any, are 
taken however, the transferee's interest should not be subject to defeat by the transferor's trustee in 
bankruptcy. Discovery of and compliance with the appropriate governing Law, however, may not be a simple 
matter. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1994) (describing scope of trustee in bankruptcy's powers); Kapila v. Atlantic 
Mortgage & lnv. Coi]J. (In re Halabi), 184 F.3d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999) (observing that trustee's powers 
under§ 544 "are necessarily limited to the actual or potential property of the bankruptcy estate"). 
4 
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sale.49 The transfer must meet certain objective tests to be considered a sale, 
notwithstanding the parties' expressed intention. 50 
Assuming the transferee is satisfied that the transfer meets the tests of sale51 and 
the asset is characterized as a "general intangible," then non-Article 9 statutory and 
49 Whether an asset transfer is a 11 true saleu or a transfer of collateml in connection with a secured loan is 
not governed by statute, but is a judicially made determination, based upon the equities of the case. Courts 
generally base their decision upon the presence (or absence) of a nwnber of factors. These factors have 
included: (i) residual interests retained by the transferor; (ii) transfer price set at fair market value by 
independent appraisers; (iii) recourse to the asset transferor; (iv) the acquisition of dominion and control 
over the assets by the transferee; (v) the transfer of the benefits and burdens of ownership by the transferee; 
and (vi) the intent of the parties as expressed in their writings. Many securitization transactions, however, 
include a variety of these factors. See, e.g., Fireman's FWld Ins. Cos. v. Grover (In re Woodson Co.), 813 
F.2d 266, 272 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that transferor retention of risk, coupled with lending interest rate, 
suggested loan, rather than sale); Bear v. Cobeo (In re Golden Plan of California, Inc.), 829 F.2d 705, 707, 
710 (9th Cir. 1986); Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538,542-44 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(describing factors relevant to determination of existence of true sale); in re Coronet Capital Co., 142 B.R. 
78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (describing instance where transfer was loan due to transferee's payment of 
interest to purchasers of interests, notwithstanding transferor's default); in re Evergreen Valley Resort, Inc., 
23 B.R. 659 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982) (finding transfer was security interest due to debtor's retained interest); 
First Nat'! Bank of Louisville v. Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. II (In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. II), 19 
B.R 609 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982) (describing instance where transfer was security interest because of 
debtor's retained interest); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 51 T.C. 500, 511 (1968), aff'd, 426 F.2d 
417 (6th Cir. 1970) (concluding that because transferor retained some risk, transfer was deemed to be loan). 
See generally Robert D. Aicher & William J. Fellerhoff, Characterization ofa Transfer ofReceivables as a 
Sale or Secured Loan upon the Bankruptcy of the Transferor, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 181, 182-84 (1991) 
(noting that bankruptcy courts look at context of asset transfer); Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale ofLoans 
and the Role ofRecourse, 14 GEO. MASON L REv. 287,290 (1991) (noting absence of universal criteria for 
detennination of sale versus loan issue); Peter L. Mancini, Note, Bankruptcy and the UCC as Applied to 
Securitization: Characterizing a Mortgage Loan Transfer as a Sale or a Secured Loan, 73 B.U. L. REv. 873, 
877-82 (1993) (noting that U.C.C. provides no rules for resolving sale versus loan issue). 
50 While parties may intend one characterization, the facts and circumstanCes of the transfer may suggest 
another. E.g., Castle Rock Indus. Bank v. S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc. (In re S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc.), 32 B.R. 279, 
283 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983) (notwithstanding parties' characterization as sale, participation agreement was 
determined to be loan tnmsaction); Boerner v. Colwell Co., 577 P.2d 200, 204-05 (Cal. 1978) (fmding 
transfer of construction contracts to be sale rather than loan). 
51 Because the definitive determination of the sale versus lOan issue is so uncertain, lawyers have 
historicaUy been reluctant (or in some instances, unwilling) to unqualifiedly conclude in legal opinions that a 
specific asset transfer is a true sale. See, e.g., George W. Bennant, The Role of the Opinion ofCounsel: A 
Tentative Reevaluation, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 132 (1974); Scott FitzGibbon & Donald W. Glazer, Legal 
Opinions in Corporate Transactions: The Opinion on Agreements and instntments, 12 J. CORP. L. 657 
(1987); Robert J. Harter, Jr. & Kenneth N. Klee, The Impact of the New Bankruptcy Code on the 
"Bankruptcy Out" in Legal Opinions, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 277 (1979); COMMllTEES OF THE NEW YORK 
COUNTY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, AND THE 
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, Legal Opinions to Third Parties: An Easier Path, 34 BUS. LAW. 
1891 ( 1979); see also United States Committee on the Judiciary Subcommillee on : Hearing the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act, I 06 Congress (March 18, I 999) (statement of Seth Grosshandler, Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, 
Steen & Hamilton), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/l 06-gros.htm; Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1999 (Part Ill): Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law, 106th Cong. 182 
(1999) [hereinafter Grosshandler Testimony] (testimony of Seth Grosshandler, Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, 
Steen & Hamilton), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/106-gros.htm. Mr. Grosshandler stated: 
In order to obtain sales treaunent under the relevant accounting standards, participants 
in mortgage-backed and asset-backed securitization transactions must obtain assurances 
from counsel that the sale of assets will be flnal under applicable bankruptcy law. Such 
legal advice is referred to as a "true sale opinion." Unfortunately, there is a lack of 
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case law dictates the steps necessary to perfect the transferee's interest. If these 
steps are taken, then the transferee is protected against the strong arm of the 
transferor's bankruptcy trustee. 52 If, however, the transfer is ultimately characterized 
as a transfer of collateral for a loan, and an Article 9 financing statement was not 
filed,53 upon the originator's bankruptcy, the assets must be returned to the debtor's 
bankruptcy estate. 54 
Even if the parties' characterization of both the assets transferred and the nature 
of the transfer is deemed to be correct, however, the transferor's bankruptcy may 
still pose a threat to the interests of the transferee. While it is commonly understood 
that the sale of an asset, if perfected,55 removes it from the transferor's bankruptcy 
estate, this understanding is not urnversa!.56 For example, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Octagon Gas Systems v. Rimmer (In re Meridian 
Reserve, Inc.), 57 held that property sold by the debtor prior to its bankruptcy was 
includable in debtor's bankruptcy estate.58 The Tenth Circuit relied upon the 
guiding judicial precedent regarding what constitutes such a true sale of assets. The 
considerations in the analysis are highly subjective and depend on a qualitative 
assessment of a wide variety of facts and circumstances. For these and other reasons, 
any true sale opinion will generally be a reasoned one, with various assumptions as to 
factual matters and conclusions that introduce an unnecessary degree of legal 
uncertainty in the asset-backed market. As a result, for some types of transactions, true 
sale opinions can be extremely difficult, costJy, and in a few cases, impossible to 
render. 
/d. at 189-90. 
"See U.C.C. § 9-30!(1)(b) (1995) . 
.SJ See U.C.C. § 9-302 (1995) (describing requirements for filing of financing statements for intangibles, 
including accounts). 
"See II U.S.C. §§ 544, 547,550 (1994) (describing power of bankruptcy trustee to recover assets held by 
third parties absent perfected security interest). Revised U.C.C. § 9-318(b) official comment 3 states: 
Another aspect of sales of accounts and chattel paper also was implicit, and equally 
obvious, under fanner Article 9: If the buyer's security interest is unperfected, then for 
purposes of determining the rights of certain third parties, the seller (debtor) is deemed 
to have all rights and title that the seller sold..... As a consequence of subsection (b), if 
the buyer's security interest is unperfected, the seller can transfer, and the creditors of 
the seller can reach, the account or chattel paper as if it had not been sold. 
/d. 
"See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt. 3. See generally Barkley Clark, Revised Article 9 of the UCC.· Scope. 
Perfection, Priorities, and Default, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 129, 131 (2000) (describing application of 
revised § 9-318). 
"See Octagon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve, Inc.), 995 F.2d 948, 957 n.9 (lOth Cir. 
1993) (rejecting view that sale of asset, if perfected, removes it from transferor's bankruptcy estate). 
" 995 F.2d 948 (I Oth Cir. !993). In Octagon, the lnlnsferee did not file a financing statement to perfect its 
interest, leaving it vulnerable to avoidance by the bankruptcy trustee, pursuant to its section 544(a) lien 
avoidance powers. It is possible, however, that the transferee was automatically perfected under section 9­
302(1)(e)./d. at 957-58 & n.IO. See U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(e) (1995) (providing for automatic perfection of 
cenain isolated and small transfers ofaccoWlts). 
58 Octagon did not present the issue of what is included in a transferor's bankruptcy estate in the context of 
a prototypical securitization. Instead, the transferor was transferring interests in the proceeds of certain sales 
of natural gas. In re Meridian Reserve, Inc., 995 F.2d at 951-52. The court initially observed that the 
transferred interest was an account, as defined by § 9-106, and sales of accounts are governed by Article 9. 
ld at 954. The court continued by observing that, notwithstanding the fact that the ..transactions giving rise 
to [the] account wete not intended to secure a debt," asset sales are c6vered by Article 9, "wftether intended 
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Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of "estate" in United States v. Whiting 
Pools, Inc.,59 in concluding that, because property of the estate includes property 
subject to a security interest, and because the sales of accounts are governed by the 
law governing transfers of security interests, accounts sold remain property of the 
debtor's bankruptcy estate. 60 
What assets are included in a securitizing originator's bankruptcy estate is the 
central concern of parties to securitization transactions.61 As a practical matter, if 
securitized assets are deemed part of the originator's bankruptcy estate, the 
transferee is a "party in interest" 62 in the originator's bankruptcy, and as such, the 
transferee is required to participate in the proceedings. Furthermore, as a party in 
interest, the transferee is subject to collateral substitution, reduction in priority of 
payment and other alterations of rights.63 The assets that the transferee has an 
interest in are accessible to the debtor-in-possession as cash collateral,64 with only 
"adequate protection" offered the transferee as compensation for the possibility of a 
for security or not." Jd. at 955. The underlying asset, natural gas, once extracted and sold, is a "good," and 
the payment stream arising from the sale of that good is an "accoWlt." ld. at 954~55. Article 9 defines an 
"account" as "any right to payment for goods sold ... which is not evidenced by an instrument of chattel 
pap,er." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A § 9-106 (West Supp. 1993). 
9 462 U.S. 198, 203-205 (1994). In Whiting Pools, the Internal Revenue Service had a tax lien on the 
debtor's assets and prior to bankruptcy, seized and was planning to sell these assets. Just prior to the sale, 
Whiting Pools, the debtor, filed for bankruptcy protection under chapter 11. The IRS claimed that 
notwithstanding the fact that the foreclosure sale had not yet taken place at the time bankruptcy was filed, 
the seized assets were nonetheless not included within the definition of debtor's bankruptcy estate. The 
Supreme Court disagreed and held that the IRS was required to return the property to Whiting Pools as 
debtor-in-possession pursuant to § 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. /d. at 203, 205. Citing both the legislative 
history and the language of Bankruplcy Code § 54l(a)(l), the Court observed that § 541 is "intended to 
include in the estate any property made available to the estate by other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code," 
id. at 204, and that in order to "facilitate the rehabilitation of the debtor's business, all of the debtor's property 
must be included in the reorganization estate, including property in which a creditor has a security interest." 
id. at 203. Congress could have specifically excluded property subject to a security interCst from the 
bankruptcy estate, but instead "chose . . . to include such property in the estate and to provide secured 
creditors with 'adequate protection' for their iJ!.terests." /d. If such encumbered property is in the possession 
of a third party, lhe trustee has the authoriry pursuant to § 542(a) to demand that the party in possession of 
estate property tum such property over to the debtor's estate. !d. 
60 See In re Meridian Reserve, Inc., 995 F.2d at 955. 
61 See ROSENTHAL & OcAMPO, supra note 8, at 6; see also Thomas J. Gordon, Securitization ofExecutory 
Future Flows as Bankruptcy-Remote True Sales, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (2000) (stating once assets 
secwitized they are not included in bankruptcy estate eliminating risk of regular unsecured and secured 
anangernents); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death ofLiability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1996) [hereinafter LoPucki, 
Liability] (discussing benefits of asset securitization where company keeps valuable assets separate from 
entities at risk).
62 Section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code defmes "party in interest" to include debtor1s creditors. 11 
U.S.C. § II 09(b) (1994). See W. Auto Supply Co. v. Savage Anns, Inc. (In re Savage Indus., Inc.), 43 F.3d 
714, 720 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that parties of interest, for bankruptcy purposes, includes any entity with 
pecuniary interests which might be adversely affected, not just those with claims). 
63 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994). 
64 See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1994) (outlining circumstances and conditions under which debtor may use its 
cash collateral); see also In re Kain, 86 B.R. 506, 511 (Bankr. W.O. Mich. 1988) (stating consent or court 
order is needed for use of cash collateral); Weiss v. People Sav. Bank (In re Three Partners. Inc.), 199 B.R. 
230, 236 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995) (using cash collateral is prohibited under § 363(c)(2) unless all creditors 
with security interest consent or under court order). 
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depletion of its interest.65 In contrast, if transferred assets are not deemed included 
in the debtor's bankruptcy estate, the transferee is not required to participate in its 
originator's bankruptcy in any way. In addition, it is not compelled to continue its 
relationship with its originator. In short, such transferees may simply take their 
assets and go home. 66 
The view that account transfers can be returned to the originator's estate upon 
bankruptcy threatened the foundation upon which securitization transaction 
participants stood. While the Octagon analysis is arguably doctrinally unsound,67 
and was widely criticized,"8 it has not been without its supporters.69 Even those who 
65 Section 361(3) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the trustee to propose adequate protection by giving 
the secured claimant any form of relief that will result in the realization of the "indubitable equivalent" of the 
claimant's interest in the property. II U.S.C. § 361(3). This phrase originated in an opinion written by Judge 
Learned Hand. See In re Murel Holding Corp., 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935) ("We see no reason to 
suppose that the statute was intended to deprive him of that in the interest of junior holders, unless by a 
substitute of the most indubitable equivalence"). 
66 This is true, assuming that the transferee's rights are not voidable under§ 544(a)(l) of the Bankruptcy 
Code. II U.S.C. § 544(a)(l) (1994). Section 544(a)(l) provides: 
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard to 
any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, any knowledge of the trustee or of any 
creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or 
any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by­
(I) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the 
commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to 
such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple 
contract could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a 
creditor exists; 
!d. 
67 Not only do the state law provisions of Article 9 treat the grant of a security interest differently from a 
sale of accoWJts, tbe tenn "security interest" is not defined in the same way under the Bankruptcy Code as it 
is in Article 9. The Bankruptcy Code's definition of security interest does not include the interest of a 
purchaser of accounts, whereas § 1-201(37) of the U.C.C. states that the term "security interest" also 
includes any interest of a buyer <Jf accounts or chattel paper which is subject to Article 9. U.C.C. § 1-201(31) 
( 1995) reads: 
"Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures 
payment or performance of an obligation .... The term also includes any interest of a 
buyer of accounts or chattel paper which is subject to Article 9. 
/d. Thus, for the limited purpose of providing for a notice mechanism to third parties, Article 9's filing 
system applies to both sales of accounts and borrowings secured by accounts. Article 9 does not control, 
however, what assets constitute property of the bankruptcy estate. This is determined with reference to 
Bankruptcy Code provisions. Section 101(51) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "security interest" as a lien 
created by an agreement. II U.S.C. § 101(51). 
68 See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE~ 4.04(5], at 4-122 to 4-124 (A.S. Pratt & Sons ed., rev. ed. 2000) (perfected sales of accounts are not 
included in transferor's bankruptcy estate); see also Thomas S. Kiriakos et al., Bankruptcy, in I 
SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS,§ 5, at 5-1, -32 to -33 (noting that Octagon is "clearly incorrect"); 
Thomas E. Plank, When a Sale ofAccounts Is Not a Sale: A Critique ofOctagon Gas, 48 CONSUMER FrN. L. 
Q. REP. 45 (1994) (criticizing reasoning of Octagon); Nikiforos Mathews, Note: Circuit Court Erie Errors 
and The District Coun's Dilemma: From Rotolith and the Mirror Image Rule to Octagon Gas and Asset 
Securitization, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 739, 740-41 ( 1996) (referring to Octagon court's misinterpretation of§ 
9-102(b)). 
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did not agree with it, realized such a decision could potentially place all 
securitization transactions in jeopardy.70 Indeed, the Octagon decision, coupled with 
the uncertainty surrounding both the issue of asset classification and the scope of 
Article 9, led the PEB Drafting Committee to make a series of substantive changes 
to Article 9 designed to minimize the risk to originators and investors engaging in 
securitization transactions.71 
IV. ARTICLE 9 REVISIONS AFFECTING SECURITIZATION 
The PEB recommended the inclusion within Revised Article 9 of the "sale of 
general intangibles for the payment of money."72 This was accomplished by 
expandin~ the scope of the types of assets that fall within the definition of 
"account" 3 as well as including within Article 9's scope the sale of accounts, chattel 
paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes.74 This definitional change, 
coupled with several other revisions to a number of Article 9 provisions impacting 
securitization transactions, makes it possible for a greater number of securitized 
asset sales to fall within the scope of Article 9. These changes were enacted in 
response to the concern of securitization industry participants that the "[legal] 
uncertainty about the status of asset securitization [has] prevent[ ed] deals from 
going forward . . . "75 As observed by the PEB, "because Article 9 regulates 
important relationships among creditors and purchasers of collateral, uncertainty 
concerning its application adds to transaction costs and also can result in decreased 
availability of credit."76 Accordingly, Article 9 has been revised ostensibly to 
address issues of uncertainty and to further facilitate commercial credit and sales 
transactions. What follows is a description and analysis of the provisions 
specifically aimed at facilitating the market for securitization. 
69 See David Gray Carlson. The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 
1063-64 (1998) (arguing that, in reliance on Whiting Pools, originator retains interest in assets transferred in 
connection with securitization). 
10 See Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of Private 
Legislatures, 29 GA. L REv. 909, 928 (1995) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Fundamentalj (stating Octagon's 
holding erroneously retains transferred property in bankruptcy estate even in true leases); Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Octagon Gas Ruling Creates Turmoil for Commercial and Asset-Based Finance, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 
4, 1993, at 1, 2 (hereinafter Schwarcz, Turmoil] (sharply criticizing Octagon decision). 
71 See PEB Study, supra note 2, at 181-84; see also Robert M. Lloyd, The New Article 9: lis Impact on 
Tennessee Law, 67 TENN. L. REv. 125, 158 (1999) (stating that Revised Article 9 exlinguishes all equilable 
or legal interests in assets sold outright, thereby overruling Octagon). 
72 PEB Study, supra note 2, at 181-84. 
73 See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) cml. Sa ("Many categories of righls 10 payment that were classified as 
general intangibles under former Article 9 are accounts under this Article."). 
74 See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3). See generally Donald J. Rapson, "Receivables" Financing under Revised 
Article 9, 13 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 137 {1999) (noting that Revised Article 9 removes uncertainty around 
rules for perfection and priority of sales of receivables).
75 Picker Testimony, supra note 14, at 67. The quote continues by observing that "though you would not 
know it by the number of securitizations that take place." /d. 
76 PEB Study, supra note 2, 181-84. 
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A. Debtors Retain No Interest in Sold Assets 
The issue that was clouded by the Octagon decision -- whether a debtor retains 
an interest in sold assets -- was squarely addressed in Revised U.C.C. section 9­
318(a).17 Revised section 9-318(a) states that: 
A debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment 
intangible, or promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable 
interest in the collateral sold.78 
Comment 2 to Revised section 9-318 observes that this provision, 
... makes explicit what was implicit, but perfectly obvious, under 
former Article 9: The fact that a sale of an account or chattel paper 
gives rise to a "security interest" does not imply that the seller 
retains an interest in the property that has been sold. To the 
contrary, a seller of an account or chattel paper retains no interest 
whatsoever in the property to the extent that it has been sold. 79 
Furthermore, revised section 9-318(b) makes explicit, that "a debtor that has 
sold an account or chattel paper, while the buyer's security interest is unperfected, ... 
[has) rights and title to the account or chattel paper identical to those the debtor 
sold. "80 Comment 3 observes, "if the buyer's security interest is unperfected the 
seller can transfer, and the creditors of the seller can reach, the account or chattel 
paper as if it had not been sold. "81 Accordingly, upon the transferor's bankruptcy, 
the trustee can recover the unperfected transfer under Bankruptcy Code sectiori 
544(a), and such transferred assets are included in the bankruptcy estate. 82 
Section 9-318, however, does not address the equitable determination of 
whether ·a particular asset transfer is properly characterized as a sale of assets or a 
transfer of collateral in connection with a loan (the sale versus loan dilernma).83 
Comment 2 makes this clear in noting that, "[n]either this Article nor the definition 
n Rev. U.C.C. § 9~318. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision 
Of UCC Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 14 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1357, 1398 n.l78 (1999) 
[hereinafter Harris & Mooney, How Successfuf] ("Revised section 9-318 rejects Octagon Gas insofar as the 
opinion interpreted Article 9."); G. Ray Warner, Asset Securitization under Revised Art. 9, AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., Sept. 2000, at 16 (''Revised§ 9-318(a) is designed to overrule Octagon by providing that a debtor 
who has sold an income-producing asset does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the collateral sold"). 
"Rev. U.C.C. § 9-318(a).
19 Rev. U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt. 2. 
80 Rev. U.C.C. § 9-318(b). 
"Rev. U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt. 3. 
82 See II U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(3), 544 (1994). 
83 See infra notes 170 to 176 and accompanying text describing the proposed amendment to the 
Bankruptcy Code designed to federalize the sale versus loan detennination, based upon the parties to the 
transaction•s characterization of the transfer. 
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of 'security interest' in Section 1-201 provides rules for distinguishing sales 
transactions from those that create a security interest securing an obligation. "84 
Thus, this remains a determination to be made by courts on a case by case basis. 85 
What Revised section 9-318 does do, however, is to explicitly overrule 
Octagon, in making clear that once an asset is sold and the transferee's interest is 
perfected, the debtor retains no residual interest in the asset, either in or out of 
bankruptcy. Accordingly, under Revised section 9-318, once it is determined that a 
perfected asset transfer meets the test of a "true sale," the securitized assets are not 
vulnerable to recapture and return to the debtor or to the debtor's bankruptcy 
estate.86 
B. "Account" Defined More Broadly 
The drafters of Revised Article 9 wanted to bring a greater number of types of 
commonly securitized assets within the scope of Article 9. They did so by 
expanding the definition of the term "account"87 while retaining the rule that sales 
9.88of accounts and chattel paper are subject to the terms of Article This 
modification was designed to address one of the most vexing concerns of 
participants in the securitization markets: issues of ambiguity in asset 
characterization and in applicable law. 
To illustrate this point, assume a retailer-originator wants to securitize its pool 
of credit card receivables. Credit card receivables are the cash flows owed by credit 
card customers, for the payment of merchandise, services and various related fees. 89 
These cash flows arise pursuant to a contractual agreement between the originator 
and the credit card holders. 90 Under the laws of most states, including the U.C.C., 
credit card receivables are characterized as either "accounts," "instruments"91 or 
"Rev. U.C.C. § 9-318 cmt. 2. 
85 See supra notes 49-5 I (discussing issue at greater length). 
llfi Revised Article 9 thus explicitly rejects the argument that "even sold accounts are subject to bankruptcy 
jurisdiction, provided some 'legal or equitable' debtor property interest in the thing sold can be located." See 
Carlson, supra note 69, at 1060. Carlson identifies three property interests held by the debtor after the sale of 
accounts or chattel paper: (i) the power to convey chattel paper to subsequent pmchasers who take 
possession in the ordinary course of the business, free and clear of the asset-backed security interest holder's 
rights; (ii) the power to collect from the account debtor; and (iii) a future interest in the bankruptcy trustee•. 
on behalf of the debtor's creditors./d at 1060-61. 
87 See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2). Current§ 9-106 defines "account" as "any right to payment for goods 
sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or 
not it has been earned by performance." U.C.C. § 9-106 (1995). 
88 Revised § 9-109, states that Article 9 applies to "a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, 
orJromissory notes." Rev. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3). 
See Structured Finance Legal, supra note 33. 
90/d. 
91 See, e.g., First Union Nat'l Bank ofNorth Carolina v. Brendle's Stores, Inc. (In re Brendle's Stores, Inc.). 
165 B.R. 811, 814 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (stating that confusion concerning classification of credit card 
receivables is consequence of receivables having some attributes of instruments). Under Current Article 9, 
instruments can be perfected by possession, whereas general intangibles can be perfected only by the filing 
of a financing statement. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-304 (1995). Instruments can now be perfected by filing 
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"general ·intangibles" : 2 The sale of accounts is specifically governed by Current 
Article 9,93 but the sale of instruments and general intangibles is not. 94 Thus, the 
originator and the other parties to the transaction must first try to accurately 
characterize the asset to be securitized, and then determine the law applicable to its 
sale. If the receivable pool is, even in part, deemed general intangibles, the 
transaction is not wholly governed by Article 9, but by other law. That law may be 
common law or remnants of a pre-U.C.C. accounts receivable statute. The parties 
then must determine what steps, if any, need to be taken under non-uniform, non­
Article 9 law to perfect the account transferee's interest. If any necessary steps to 
perfection are not properly taken, upon originator's bankruptcy, the asset transferees 
may find themselves unperfected. 95 Such uncertainty has the potential to thwart the 
expectations of the asset-backed securities investors, and thus result in an expensive 
and unstable market. 
Revised Article 9, in response to this uncertainty, has included within the 
defmition of "account," assets, which under current law are deemed to be either 
"instruments," "general intangibles," 96 or non-Article 9 governed property. 
Because Article 9 continues to govern the sale of "accounts," the sale of what were 
formerly non-account, but commonly securitized assets, are now explicitly 
governed by Revised section 9-102(a)(2).97 Revised section 9-102(a)(2) reads: 
(An account is defined as] ... a right to payment of a monetary 
obligation, whether or not earned by performance, (i) for property 
that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or 
otherwise disposed of, (ii) for services rendered or to be rendered, 
(iii) for a policy of insurance issued or to be issued, (iv) for a 
secondary obligation incurred or to be incurred, (v) for energy 
provided or to be provided, (vi) for the use or hire of a vessel under 
a charter or other contract, (vii) arising out of the use of a credit or 
charge card or information contained on or for use with the card, or 
under Revised Article 9, but such perfection does not prevail against a holder in due course. See Rev. U.C.C. 
§§ 9-312(a), 9-331 (a). 
92 Stephen L. Sepinuck, Classifying Credit Card Receivables Under the U.C.C.: Playing with Instruments? 
32 ARiz. L. REv. 789 (1990) (examining characterization issues involved in sale of credit card receivables).
93 See U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(b) (1995). 
04 ld 
9 
s If unperfected upon debtor's bankruptcy trustee, their interest can be defeated by debtor's bankruptcy 
trustee. See U.C.C. § 9-301 (1995); II U.S.C. § 544 (1994). 
96 This extension of the concept of "accounts" in Revised Article 9 has the effect of reducing the range of 
assets which will qualify as general intangibles and payment intangibles. See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-102(42); see 
also THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE § 2: II, at 2-32 (2000) (royalties and 
other income streams from the licensing of intellectual property are captured under the broader definition of 
"account" in Revised Article 9). 
97 Standard & Poor's Stroctured Finance Legal Criteria report includes the following commonly 
securitized assets: automobile; recreational vehicle and marine loans; unsecured credit card receivables; 
unsecured consumer loan receivables; secured credit card receivables; trade receivables~ equipment leases; 
and student loans. Structured.Finance. supra note 33. 
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Q 
(viii) as winnings in a lottery or other game of chance operated or 
sponsored by a State, [or] governmental unit of a State .... The 
98term includes health-care-insurance receivables .... 
The redefinition of "account" will fundamentally affect the market for 
securitization by eliminating the need for securitization participants, in most 
instances, to distinguish between accounts, general intangibles and other Article 9 
and non-Article assets. The securitization of payment streams that arise from the 
sale, lease, license, assignment or other disposal of tangible and intangible assets 
(listed in Revised section 9-102(a)(2)), including credit card receivables, lottery 
receivables, equipment, aircraft, public utility receivables, hotel receivables, 
insurance receivables including health-care-insurance receivables, franchise 
receivables and intellectual property99 all will be governed by Revised Article 9."10 
As such, the rights and responsibilities of the securitization transaction parties will 
be far more certain than they are under current law. 
C. 	 Article 9's Expanded Scope - Inclusion of Sales of Payment 
Intangibles" and "Promissory Notes" 
Revised Article 9 further includes within its scope the sale of the conunonly 
securitized assets, "payment intangibles" and "promissory notes." 101 "Payment 
intangibles," defined as a "general intangible[s] under which the account debtor's 
principal obligation is a monetary obligation," are a newly identified category of 
collatera1. 102 Receivables that are not "chattel paper," "instruments" or "accounts" 
98 Rev. U.C.C. § 9-l 02(aX2). Revised§ 9-l02(a)(2) further reads: 
(2) ... The tenn does not include (i) rights to payment evidenced by chattel paper or an 
instrument, (ii) commercial tort claims, (iii) deposit accounts, (iv) investment property, 
(v) letter-of-credit rights or letters of credit, or (vi) rights to payment for money or 
funds advanced or sold, other than rights arising out of the use of a credit or charge card 
or information contained on or for use with the card. 
Id. 
99 The securitization of intellectual property royalty streams has become an increasingly popular 
phenomenon. The first intellectual property futures securitization was a $55 million ABS issuance, backed 
by the royalties from the future sale of David Bowies first 25 albwns. See Kathy Bergen, I 00 Shares of 
Pavarotti? Stars Turn to Securitization, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Dec. 6, 1997, at 16C; Peter 
Newcomb, Dead Men Earning, FORBES, Mar. 22, 1999, at 253; see also WARD, supra note 96, at§ 2: II. 
100 See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-l02(a)(2).
10
' See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-l09(a)(3) {slating "this article applies 10 ... a sale of accounts, chattel paper, 
payment intangibles, or promissory notes"). The sale of payment intangibles and promissory notes are 
subject to Article 9's perfection and priority rules. 
1 2 Rev. U.C.C. § 9-l02(a){6l). Commenl S(d) notes that "payment intangibles" are a subset of "general 
intangibles." See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt Sd. lt further states: 
Virtually any intangible right could rise to a right to payment of money once one 
hypothesizes, for example, that the account debtor is in breach of its obligation. The 
tenn "payment intangible," however, includes only those general intangibles "under 
which the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation." 
Rev. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. Sd (emphasis in original). General intangibles are a "residual category of personal 
property" under Revised Article 9. /d. Under Revised Article 9, "General intangible" encompasses 
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(because they are not property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, 
assigned or otherwise disposed of) 103 are "general intangibles" for the payment of 
money- meaning "payment intangibles." 104 The definition of "promissory note" is 
similarly new, and according to the Official Comment, was "necessitated by the 
inclusion of sales of promissory notes within the scope of Article 9." 105 
The definition of "payment intangibles" includes payment streams from the sale 
of portions of loan pools, known as loan participations. Loan participation 
transactions are not typical securitizations and are primarily originated by financial 
institutions.106 Many of the financial institutions weighing in on the Revision of 
Article 9 expressed conflicting views: they wanted to get both the benefits of 
increased certainty and decreased risk and cost of the sale of loan pool 
participations provided by Article 9 coverage, but did not want to have to satisfy the 
practical burden of filing. 107 A compromise was ultimately reached: loan 
participations, as a type of payment intangible, fall within the scope of Revised 
Article 9, but interests of participation purchasers are automatically perfected. 108 
Thus, purchases of loan pool participations are not vulnerable to defeat by the 
seller's trustee in bankruptcy without the added administration involved in having 
purchasers file a public notice of their interests in such participations. 109 
... any personal property, including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, 
commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, investment 
property, letter·of·credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals 
before extraction" are general intangibles. 
Rev. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42). Examples cited in the Official Comment include intellectual property and the 
right to payment of a loan of funds that is not evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument. See Rev. U.C.C. § 
9-l 02 cmt. Sd. 
103 See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-1 02(a)(2) (including within definition of "account," "a right to payment of a 
monetary obligation ... for property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise 
disg,osed or'). 
1 See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-l02(a)(42), (61) (defining "general intangible" and "payment intangible" 
resg,ectively). 
1 5 Rev. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5c. The definition of"promissory note" reads: 

"Promissory note" means an ins!rurnent that evidences a promise to pay a monetary 

obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain an acknowledgment 

by a bank that the bank has received for deposit a sum of money or funds. 

Rev. U.C.C. § 9-l02(a)(65). 
106 See Harris & Mooney, How Successful, supra note 77, at 1370-72 (discussing The Drafting 
Committee's recognition of loan participation challenge, with respect to general intangibles).
107 Id. at 1371-72. See also Paul M. Shupack, Making Revised Article 9 Safe for Securitizations: A Brief 
Hislory, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 167, 176 (1999) [hereinafter Shupack, Making Revised Article 9) (noting thai 
under Current Article 9, cash flows from sale of loan pools are deemed to be general intangibles and thus, 
their sale is not governed by Article 9); SECURJTIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, supra note 8, at 6-18 
(ex£1aining that loan pool parricipations are not governed by Current Article 9). 
1 8 See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-309(3) ("The following security interests are perfected when they attach: ... (3) a 
sale of a payment intangible;"). Shupack, Making Revised Article 9, supra note 107, at 176. The danger with 
such automatic perfection of a transfer of payment intangibles and promissory notes is that searchers of the 
public records will not discover another party's prior interest in these assets. 
109 Transferees of loan pool participations, however, are well advised to file a financing statement to 
perfect their interests to avoid the challenge that they are unperfected because the transfer was a transfer of 
collateral and not a true sale. Under Revised Article 9, security interests in promissory notes may be 
perfected. by filing. See Rev. U.C.C. §§ 9-310(a), 9-312(a); see also Rsnda! C. Picker, Perfection 
306 ABILA W REVIEW [Vol. 9:287 
With the inclusion of the sales of promissory notes and payment intangibles, 
virtually every asset with a payment stream - and tbus every asset that can be 
securitized -- is governed by Revised Article 9. 
D. Express Validation ofAfter Acquired Receivables to be Securitized 
"After acquired property" and "after acquired collateral" are terms used in both 
Current and Revised Article 9 referring to property of tbe debtor received after the 
initial financing transaction. 110 "Future advances" are advances of value by the 
transferee after tbe initial advance.'" If a security agreement is broad enough to 
cover "after acquired collateral" and "future advances," tbe asset transferee's interest 
attaches to the "after acquired collateral" and secures the "future advance." 112 
Revised sections 9-204(a) & (c) expressly validate "after acquired property" 
and "future advance" clauses when the transaction involves the sale of "accounts," 
"chattel paper," "payment intangibles" and "promissory notes." 113 The comment 
observes tbat these provisions makes explicit what was implicit under Current 
Article 9. 114 While not changing tbe law, tbis revision will increase ABS investors' 
confidence that their initially perfected interests in asset-backed securities, 
subsequently backed by after acquired payment streams and sold in connection with 
future advances, remain perfected. 
Hierarchies and Nontemporal Priority Rules, 74 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 1157 (1999) (discussing Revised 
Article 9's process ofperfection); Pryor, supra note 6, at 474 (discussing filing under Revised Article 9). 
" 
0 See U.C.C. §§ 9-108,9-204 (1995); Rev. U.C.C. § 9-204. 

'"See U.C.C. § 9-204 (1995); Rev. U.C.C. § 9-204. 

112 See U.C.C. §§ 9-108,9-204 (1995); Rev. U.C.C. § 9-204. 

113 Revised sections 9-204 (a) & (c) read: 

(a) (After-acquired coUateraJ.) ... a security agreement.may create or provide for a 
security interest in after-acquired collateral. 
(c) (Future advances and other value.) A security agreement may provide that 
collateral secures, or that accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory 
notes are sold in connection with, future advances or other value, whether or not the 
advances or value are given pursuant to commitment. 
ld 
114 Rev. U.C.C. § 9-204 cmt. 6 states: 

Sales of Receivables. Subsections (a) and (c) expressly validate after-acquired property 

and funare advance clauses not only when the trarisaction is for security pUiposes but 

also when the transaction is the sale of acco1.mts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or 

promissory notes. This result was implicit under fonner Article 9. 

Jd But see Carlson, supra note 69, at 1111-12 ("Article 9 does not expressly authorize after-acquired 
property clauses when accounts are sold. Rather, it authorizes after-acquired property clauses only when a 
lender advances a loan and takes after-acquired accounts as collateral."). . 
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E. 	 The Facilitation of Transfers of Accounts, General Intangibles, Payment 
Intangibles and Promissory Notes 
Revised Article 9, building upon Current section 9-318(4), 115 sets forth a 
number of provisions designed to render ineffective certain provisions in law and 
contract restricting the transfer of certain commonly-held securitized assets. 116 
Revised section 9-406( d) provides that any contractual provision between a debtor 
and an account debtor prohibiting the assignment or transfer of an account, chattel 
paper, general intangible, payment intangible or promissory note is ineffective.117 
Revised section 9-406(f) extends the prohibitions on assignment and transfer of 
accounts and chattel paper to provisions found in statutes and common law. 118 
Revised section 9-408 renders ineffective any contractual provision or legal rule 
"' U.C.C. § 9-3 I 8(4) (1995) reads: 

A term in any contract between an account debtor and an assignor is ineffective if it 

prohibits assignment of an account or prohibits creation of a security interest in a 

general intangible for money due or to become due or requires the account debtor's 

consent to such assignment or security interest. 

!d. 
"'See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-406, 9-408. 
117 Rev. U.C.C. § 406(d) reads: 
(d) [Term restricting assignment generally ineffective.] Except as otherwise 
provided in subsection (e) and Sections 2A-303 and 9-407, and subject" to subsection 
(h), a term in an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor or in a 
promissory note is ineffective to the extent that it: 
(I) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the account debtor or 
person obligated on the promissory note to the assignment or transfer of, or 
the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in, 
the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note; or 
(2) provides that the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of the 
security interest may give rise to a defauJt, breach, right of recoupment, 
claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the 
account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note. 
ld See generally Carl S. Bjerre, International Project Finance Transactions: Selected Issues under Revised 
Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 261, 294 (1999) (maintaining that Revised Article 9 made certain anti­
assi~ent c1auses ineffective in response to pressure for commercial transactions to go forward). 
11 	 Rev. U.C.C. § 406(1) reads: 

... a rule of Law, statute, or regulation that prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of 

a government, governmental body or official, or account debtor to the assignment or 

transfer of, or creation of a security interest in, an account or chattel paper is ineffective 

to the extent that the rule of law, statute or regulation: 

(1) prohibits, restricts or requires the consent of the government, 
governmental body or official, or account debtor to the assigrunent or 
transfer of, or the creation, attachment. perfection, or enforcement of a 
security interest in the account or chattel paper; or 
(2) provides that the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of the 
security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, 
claim, defense, termination, right of tennination, or remedy under the 
account or chattel paper. 
!d. See Edwin E. Smith, Overview of Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. I, 38 (1999) (noting that 
Revised U.C.C. § 9406(f) renders ineffective any law preventing attachment, perfection, or enforcement of 
security interests in account or chattel paper). 
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applicable to a general intangible or health-care receivable that prevents the 
attachment and perfection of a security interest, provided that the rights of the 
account debtor119 are not adversely affected. 12°Consent of the account debtor, 
however, is required to enforce such security interest. 121 Revised section 9-408( d) 
preserves the substantive rights and obligations of account debtors and those 
obligated on promissory notes, even in light of the assignment or transfer of such 
account or note. 122 
These changes in Revised Article 9 are designed to further facilitate the 
securitization of assets by removing or reducin§ restrictions on such assets' transfer 
while protecting account debtors' interests.' 3 Debtors ability to transfer, in 
connection with a securitization, a broader range of assets is enhanced by Revised 
Article 9's limits on circumstances in which such transfer would give rise to a 
default or a breach by the transferee. 
119 Comment 5 to Revised§ 9-408 further makes clear that the term "account debtor," defined in Revised§ 
9-102(3), refers to 
the party, other than the debtor, to a general intangible, including a permit, license, 
franchise, or the like, and the person obligated on a health-care-insurance receivable, 
which is a type of account. The definition of "account debtor" does not limit the term to 
persons who are obligated to pay under a general intangible. Rather, the term includes 
all persons who are obligated on a general intangible, including those who are obligated 
to render performance in exchange for payment. 
Rev. U.C.C. § 9408 cmt. 5. The licensor of intellectual property is obligated to perform on "general 
intangibles" and is therefore an "account debtor." See WARD, supra note 96, at§ 2:13. 
120 Revised§ 9-408(a) & (c) declares ineffective any contractual term or law, statute or regulation that: 
(1) would impair the creation, attachment or perfection of a security interest; or 
(2) provides that the assigrunent or transfer or the creation, attachment, or perfection of 
the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, 
defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the promissory note, health­
care-insurance receivable, or general intangible. 
Rev. U.C.C. § 9-408 (a), (c). Revised§ 9-406(e) renders Revised § 9-406(d) & (f) inapplicable to sales of 
payment intangibles and promissory notes but Revised § 9-408(a) and (c) step in to fill this void by making 
invalid attempts to restrict a Revised Article 9 sale of payment intangibles and promissory notes. See Rev. 
U.C.C. § 9-408(a), (c). 
121 See Rev. U.C.C. § '9-408(d) (describing limitations on rights of secured party while preserving rights of 
account debtor); see also Bjerre, supra note 117, at 301 (discussing fact that Revised Article 9 gives debtor 
ri~t to enforce security interest, but does not entitle secured party to exercise that right). 
22 See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-408(d) (describing limitations on rights of secured party while preserving rights of 
account debtor); see also Bjerre, supra note 117, at 190 (noting that, to extent assignment is effective,§ 9­
408(d) frees account debtor from various obligations to secured party). 
123 See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(3) ("'Account debtor' means a person obligated on an account, chattel 
paper, or general intangible .... [but] does not include persons obligated to pay a negotiable instrument, 
even if the instrument constitutes part of chattel paper."); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact on 
Securitization ofU.C.C. Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 947,959 (1999) (maintaining that another 
rationale for changes might be fact that refusal to enforce anti-assignment clauses does not in any way 
prejudice obligor, while enforcement of clause would impair free alienability of property rights). 
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F. Broader Definition of "Proceeds" 
Another significant change affecting securitization found in Revised Article 9 is 
its definition of what constitutes "proceeds" of collatera\.124 Revised section 9­
102(a)(64) defines "proceeds" as "whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, 
exchange, or other disposition of collateral," and "rights arising out of collateral."m 
This definition, in eliminating the requirement that to constitute proceeds, the 
original collateral must be "disposed" of, expands the type of collateral that may be 
claimed by a perfected holder of securitized assets. The impact of this expanded 
definition is most fully realized upon the securitization originator's bankruptcy. 
Bankruptcy law makes a clear distinction between proceeds of collateral, and 
property that arises after the initial secured transaction that does not fall within the 
definition of "proceeds" - namely "after acquired collateral." Assets that are 
acquired by a bankruptcy debtor following the filing of a petition are either deemed 
to be "proceeds," or "after acquired property." 126 Section 552 of the Bankruptcy 
Code severs secured parties' interests in "after acquired collateral," unless the post­
petition collateral is proceeds of the original collatera\. 127 Section 552, in limiting 
its recognition of post-petition security interests, furthers the bankruptcy policy of 
preserving the value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the bankruptcy 
debtor's unsecured creditors. 128 
124 Current Article 9 defines "proceeds" as what is "received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other 
disl',osition of collateral or proceeds." U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1995). 
1 Rev. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64). "Proceeds" now specifically includes "cash or stock dividends distributed 
on account of securities or other investment property that is original collateral," rejecting the holding of 
FDIC v. Hastie (In re Hastie), 2 F.3d 1042 (lOth Cir. 1993). Rev. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 13a. 
"'See II U.S.C. § 552 (1994) (describing post-petition effect of security interest in property); see also 
Samuel M. Stricklin & Alexander P. Okuliar, Characterization ofHea/thcare Receivables: Are Post·Petition 
Healthcare Receivables Subject to Pre-Petition Liens as "Proceeds'' or "Rents" under the Bankruptcy Code, 
or Are They Excluded as After-Acquired Property?, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 47, 49-50 (2000) 
(discussing distinction in§ 552 between "proceeds" and after-acquired property). 
127 II U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994) states that: · 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, property acquired by the estate 
or by tbe debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting 
from any security agreement entered into by the debtor before the commencement of 
the case. 
/d. II U.S.C. § 552(h)(l) (1994) states: 
(h)(l) ... if the debtor and an .entity entered into a security agreement before the 
commencement of the case and if the security interest created by such security 
agreement extends to property of the debtor acquired before the commencement of the 
case and to proceeds, product, offspring. or profits of such property, then such security 
interest extends to such proceeds, product, offspring. or profits acquired by the estate 
after the commencement of the case to the extent provided by such security agreement 
and by applicable nonbankruptcy law, except to any extent that the court, after notice 
and a hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise. 
/d. 
128 
"The scope of ... [§ 54l(a)(I)] is broad. It includes aU kinds of property, including tangible or 
intangible property, causes of action ... and all other fonns of property currently specified in § 70a of the 
Bankruptcy Act." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323; S. REP. 
NO. 95-989, at 82 (1978), reprinted in- 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868. See also supra notes 25-27 
310 ABILA W REVIEW [Vol. 9:287 
Because the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define "proceeds," the Article 
9 proceeds definition becomes very important to the determination of what estate 
property remains unencumbered. 129 Because the interests of ABS purchasers can 
reach proceeds, but not after acquired property, 130 the expanded definition of 
"proceeds" in Revised Article 9 will result in less unencumbered "after acquired 
property" and a greater number and type of assets deemed to be the "proceeds" of 
asset-backed security-holder's interests. Accordingly, a debtor's efforts at 
reorganization will be thwarted in the absence of its ability to access the cash flow 
from its post-petition assets. 131 
V. SECURITIZATION AND TliE BANKRUPTCY DYNAMIC 
There is a debate among legal scholars concerning whether secured creditors 
ought to have full priority in bankruptcy. Some posit that it is economically 
efficient and socially desirable for secured claims in bankruptcy to have full priority 
of repayment. 132 In contrast, other scholars, citing fairness and efficiency, have 
(discussing cases describing necessity of post-petition cash flow in connection with debtor's reorganization 
and for payment to unsecured creditors). 
129 Courts have not been consistent in their interpretation of what is meant by "proceeds, product, 
offspring, or profits" in§ 552(b). The exception 11 except to any extent that the court . .. based on the equities 
of the case, orders otherwise" has only added to the inconsistency of court opinions with respect to this issue. 
See In re Hastie, 2 F.3d at 1045-46 (relying upon state law definition of proceeds in holding that security 
interest in stock dividends were not perfected because dividends were not substituted for disposed of stock 
(collateral), pursuant to § 9-306(4)); Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Marepcon Fin. Corp. (In re Bumper 
Sales, Inc.), 907 F.2d 1430, 1437 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that Article 9's definition of "proceeds" was 
definition to be applied in determining scope of Bankruptcy Code § 552(b)); J. Catton Farms, Inc. v. First 
Nat'! Bank of Chicago, 779 F.2d 1242, 1246 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that party with security interest in 
receivables and accounts had perfected interest, as proceeds, in payment received post-petition pursuant to 
pre-petition account). Revised Article 9 brings licensing income within the definition of "proceeds" whether 
or not any portion of the underlying intellectual property was "disposed of' under the license. See Rev. 
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64XA); WARD, supra note 96, al § 2:29, 2-86Io 2-91. 
130 See WARD, supra note 96, at§ 2:29, 2-86 to 2-91; see also LUpica, Circumvention, supra note 15, at 
204-05 (noting that by expanding definition of proceeds, drafters of Revised Article 9 greatly enhanced 
position of leveraged secured lenders). 
131 See infra notes 140-150 and accompanying text; see also In re Sullivan Ford Sales, 2 B.R. 350, 355 
(Bankr. D. Me. 1980) ("Reorganization under either the Bankruptcy Code or the Bankruptcy Act is a 
perilous process, seldom more so than at the outset of the proceedings when the debtor is often without 
sufficient cash flow to fund essential business operations."). 
132 See Richard L. Barnes, The Efficiency Justification for Secured Transactions: Foxes with Soxes and 
Other Fanciful Stuff, 42 KAN. L. REv. 13 (1993) (questioning judgment of Revised Article 9 drafters); 
Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities among Creditors, 88 YALE 
L.J. 1143 (1979) (discussing advantages of secured transactions); Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, 
Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REv. 2103 ( 1994) (discussing theory of Article 9); Homer Kripke, 
Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum ofFact, 133 U. 
PA. L. REv. 929 (1985) (discussing economics of Article 9); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of 
Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1051 ( 1984) (discussing economic justifications for Article 9); Robert E. 
Scott, A Relational Theory ofSecured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 90 I ( 1986) (discussing justifications 
for regulation of secured financing); Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 
RUTGERS L. REv. 1067, 1118 (1989) [hereinafter Shupack, Puzzle] (questioning creation of voluntary 
unsecured debt); James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 V AND. L. REv .. 
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challenged the absolute supremacy of secured claims, to the exclusion of unsecured 
claims. 133 A number of these scholars have raised the question of whether secured 
financing's continued dominance misallocates resources by forcing unsecured 
creditors into the role of recipient of limited residual interests, without their 
affirmative consent. 134 
Notwithstanding this academic debate, the drafters of Revised Article 9 did 
nothing to change secured creditors' supremacy, nor limit the extent to which 
personal property can be encumbered by consensual liens. 135 Indeed, many of the 
Article 9 revisions make it easier for secured creditors to create and perfect security 
interests in a greater number of types of assets, 136 thereby enhancing the primacy of 
highly leveraged secured lenders in· bankruptcy -- arguably at the expense of the 
473 (1984) [hereinafter White, Justifications] (discussing efficiency justifications for secured property 
re~lation).
33 See Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority ofSecured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, I05 YALE L.J. 857 ( 19%) (challenging desirability of law that entitles secured creditors to full 
amount of their secured claim); Vern Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 15 COM. L.J. 269 
(1970); Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions ofa 
Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605 (1981) (questioning secured financing preference towards 
secured creditors); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1894-1895 
( 1994) [hereinafter LoPucki, Bargain] (questioning reasons for existence of unsecured debt). 
134 See Bebchuck & Fried, supra note 133, at 865 (arguing that giving full priority to secured claims 
promotes inefficient rather than efficient markets); LoPucki, supra note 133, at 1894-95 (discussing 
problems with giving full priority to secured claims); see also Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with 
lmper:fectlnformation: The Article 9 Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373 (1997) (arguing that 
Article 9 allows two parties to change collection rights of third party). 
135 As noted in the PEB Commentary: 

[One could ask] ... whether Article 9 should limit the types of property that can be 

subjected to a security interest or the extent to which a debtor's property can be so 

encumbered. Or one might question whether any perfection step should be necessary to 

obtain priority over judicial lien creditors or other competing claimants. Or one might 

question whether security interests ought to be enforceable at all. 

Although it is well aware of challenges to the validity of some basic principles that 

underlie Article 9, the Committee chose not tu undertake a thorough reexamination of 

those principles. Nor did the Committee's deliberations reflect strong support for 

making major adjustments in the balance that Article 9 now strikes between secured 

parties and unsecured creditors. But insofar as the Committee's recommendations 

would make it easier and less costly to take and peifect security interests, they are 

likely to have the effect of improving the position of secured parties relative to that of 

unsecured creditors .... The Committee believes that any necessary adjustments for the 

protection of third parties should be made directly, as by changing Article 9's priority 

rules or by modifying the avoidance powers or other distributional rules of the 

Bankruptcy Code, and not indirectly, as by increasing the difficulty and expense of 

creating perfected security interests. 

PEB Study, supra note 2, at 8w9. See also James J. White, The Politics of Article 9: Work and Play in 
Revising Article 9, 80 VA. L. REV. 2089 (1994) [hereinafter White, Work and Play] (declaring that 
efficiency of Article 9 is irrelevant to revision process); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The 
Article 9 Study Committee Report: Strong Signals and Hard Choices, 29 IDAHO L. REv. 56!, 562-63 (1993) 
[hereinafter Harris & Mooney, Strong Signals] ("Article 9 represents what many believe to be a grand 
victory for secured parties."). 
136 See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-304 (providing for perfection of security interest in deposit accounts); see id. § 9­
102(2) (expanded definition of "account"); see id. § 9-102(64) (expanded definition of"proceeda"). 
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debtor's unsecured creditors. 137 The targeted changes to Article 9, which make it 
easier to securitize more types of assets with greater certainty, will similarly result 
in fewer assets of value available for the benefit of the debtor's unsecured 
creditors.138 
Highly leveraged secured lending transactions and securitization have much in 
common. 139 Securitization, however, has the potential to pose a greater risk to an 
originator's unsecured creditors in bankruptcy than do secured credit transactions. 140 
131 Professor Barry Zaretsky referred to the Article 9 revision as a "love feast for secured creditors." 
JULIAN B. MCDONNELL, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANALYSIS OF REVISED ARTICLE 9, 2 (1999). 
138 See Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 18, at 618-35; Lupica, Circumvention, supra note 15, at 
232-40. 
139 In both secured lending and securitization transactions, the financing-seeking finn receives cash in 
exchange for the relinquishment of a property interest in identified assets. In the case of both transaction 
types, the impact on the debtor's unsecured creditors turns, in part, on the extent to which the debtor makes 
more productive use of the cash received as loan proceeds from the secured loan, or the cash proceeds from 
the sale of the asset. See Lupica, Circumvention, supra note 15, at 237-39. 
140 A securitizing originator may have a greater motive and opportunity to use securitization proceeds to 
distribute dividends to shareholders or otherwise put Wisecured creditors' chance of repayment at greater risk 
relative to a comparable secured financing. For example, the documentation for secured lending 
arrangements typically contain provisions that are protective of a debtor's unsecured creditors' interests. 
These security documents may include covenants not to incur additional debt, or further encwnber assets, 
and thus discourage a debtor from making financially imprudent decisions to borrow more than it can 
realistically pay back. Likewise, if existing unsecured creditor covenants do not limit or control the debtors' 
use of securitization proceeds, they may be used in ways that result in a dilution of unsecured claims. See R. 
Stulz & H. Johnson, An Analysis ofSecured Debt, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 501-21 (1985) (asserting that secured 
credit returns value to existing creditors and shareholders only when there is positive change in investment 
policy). Although many creditors will include covenants restricting the further encumbrance or sale of assets 
in their loan documents, to the extent that these covenants do not anticipate the possibility of securitization, 
an originator could take advantage of this oversight to securitize its assets. In such a situation, when the 
creditor's debt matures and the originator seeks to replace it, the secured creditors may charge a higher 
interest rate that reflects the new overall higher risk to the debtor, thus again increasing this finn's overall 
cost of capital. See Minton, et al., supra note 30, at 4 (arguing that both secured debt and securitized debt 
may help the flnn engage in asset substitution ll!ld finns with high leverage and in financial distress are more 
likely to securitize their assets). Moreover, because they have an ongoing interest in the economic health of 
their borrowers, secured creditors are motivated to monitor the debtor's business activities. This monitoring 
activity can take the form of receipt of reports about the debtor's business prospects, the provision of 
fmancial counseling and management advice and the placing of restrictions on the debtor's further incunence 
of debt. A secured lender with a central position in a debtor's business enterprise has the leverage to make 
sure that the debtor acts on its advice. In a sense, a secured lender, who has provided a debtor with a 
significant percentage of its operating capital, functions as a joint venturer with the debtor in its business 
activities. In contrast, no monitoring of the debtor/originator takes place by the securitized asset purchasers. 
While a comprehensive review of the originator is conducted by ABS investors at the outset of the 
transaction, there is little if any ongoing monitoring of the debtor's business for efficiency and fmancial 
health. Indeed there is no need for this type of continuing review; whether the ABS investors get paid 
depends upon the quality of the asset pool and the credit enhancement arrangement - not the financial 
strength of the originator. The presence of a secured creditor performing its monitoring function provides a 
signal to the firm's other creditors that the debtor and its business activities are being comprehensively 
policed by an interested party. This signal is particularly valuable to a finn's unsecmed creditors, who 
typically do not have the resources or the access to monitor or receive signals from the debtor itself. See 
generally Jackson & Kronman, supra note 132 (monitoring of debtor by secured creditors justifies concept 
of security as efficient); Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 18, at 618-35 (discussing impact of 
securitization on debtor's Wisecured creditors); Lupica, Circumvention, supra note 15, llt 232-40 (discussing 
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The central reason for unsecured creditors' vulnerability in a securitizing 
originator's bankruptcy has to do with securitization's impact upon the debtor's 
bankruptcy estate. 
Upon a debtor's bankruptcy, an estate is created which includes "all [of debtor's] 
legal or equitable interests ... in property as of the commencement of the case," 
"
141
"wherever located and by whomever held. The bankruptcy estate includes 
property encumbered by security interests.142 It does not, however, generally 
include property the debtor has sold in connection with a securitization. 143 The 
removal of securitized assets from an originator's bankruptcy estate has the potential 
to drastically change the bankruptcy dynamic. 
Debtors in bankruptcy need the cash flow from their receivables to accomplish 
their goal of business reorganization under chapter 11.144 These receivables may be 
the only cash or cash equivalent available to pay trade creditors, employees, 
consumer claims and other unsecured creditors while the debtor is in the process of 
rehabilitation. 145 If an originator's liquid assets are deemed not to be part of the 
bankruptcy estate available to sustain the debtor while the debtor is negotiating its 
reorganization, then the reorganization will not be feasible and the business will 
fail.146 . 
In contrast, under the bankruptcy rules, secured creditors' collateral is deemed 
part of debtor's bankruptcy estate and, if such collateral is necessary for the debtor's 
reorganization, it may be used by the debtor in furtherance of its reorganization. 147 
While bankruptcy law respects non-bankruptcy property interests, including 
how Revised Article 9's changes, impact securitization and their potential impact upon debtor's unsecured 
creditors). · 
141 II U.S.C. § 54l(a)(l994). See also CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 274 (1997). 
142 See TABB, supra. 
143 One of the hallmarks of securitization, and indeed the principal feature that makes this transaction 
attractive to investors, is originator's potential ability to remove the securitized assets from the reach of its· 
bankruptcy trustee. But see supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text (discussing Octagon Gas Systems v. 
Rimmer). Assets transferred in what is determined to be a preferential transfer or a fraudulent conveyance 
are also vulnerable to return to the debtor's bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994) (outlining 
circumstances under which assets transferred within 90 days of bankruptcy are deemed to be voidable 
preferences); see id § 548 (describing when transfer is fraudulent conveyance). 
144 See supra note 25 (listing bankruptcy cases describing reorganizing debtor's need for cash flow); 11 
U.S.C. § 363(c)(l) (1994). 
'" See II U.S. C. § 363( c)( I) ( 1994) (noting times when truslee does oot need court permission to sell or 
lease property). 
I% See supra notes 25-26 (listing cases describing central role of cash collateral in business debtor's 
reor~anization). 
14 If a secured creditor's collateral is "necessary to an effective reorganization," the court may deny a 
secured creditor's motion to lift the aUtomatic stay and grant the· secured creditor "adequate protection." See 
II U.S.C. §§ 361, 364(d}, 541 (1994); see also Worcester County Nat'! Bank v. Xinde Int'l, Inc. (In re Xinde 
Int'l, Inc.), 13 B.R. 212, 215 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) ("The court in a reorganization case must balance the 
needs of the creditor's protection against the debtor's likelihood of a successful rehabilitation. If the court 
acts too swiftly and too rigidly in requiring adequate protection, this debtor's chance of reorganization may 
be so severely damaged as to be nonexistent."). 
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security interests, 148 secured creditors are entitled in bankruptcy to receive only the 
value of their collateral, and not the collateral itself. A secured creditor may merely 
be offered "adequate protection" 149 in the fonn of substitute collateral or some other 
interest that is the "indubitable equivalent." 150 
Debtor's ability to use its liquid assets may make the difference between a 
successful reorganization and business failure. In many cases, business failure will 
mean that employees, suppliers, trade creditors and customers of a securitizing 
debtor will lose their opportunity to continue a profitable and beneficial relationship 
with a reorganized and reinvigorated business. 151 Perhaps the largest impact a 
further proliferation of securitization will have on the bankruptcy dynamic will be 
the end of cash collateral, and thus the end of the reorganization of viable 
businesses. 
Not only will unsecured creditors of a securitizing originator be harmed by an 
increased chance ofbusiness liquidation, but the bankruptcy dividend distributed to 
unsecured creditors of securitizing originators may be smaller, relative to what they 
might receive had the originator engaged in a secured financing. 152 Following a 
securitization and upon bankruptcy, the assets that comprise the estate are those 
assets that were not securitized. While a secured credit transaction similarly 
involves the encumbrance of assets which, if unencumbered, would likely be used 
to pay unsecured creditors in bankruptcy, unsecured creditors of a securitizing 
originator may find themselves in a more dire position. 153 
To illustrate, when a securitizing originator's asset pool is initially assembled, 
the underwriter, in consultation with the credit rating agency, 154 will analyze the 
receivable pool's historic record and discard those receivables perceived to be high 
risk. 155 Certain receivables will be eliminated from the pool because of a history of 
late payment, an origination from specific, less desirable industries, depressed 
geographical regions or from classes of less financially dependable obligors. 156 
Specific loss probability parameters will be set by the underwriters, and those 
143 The Supreme Court has recognized that secured creditors' property interest in their collateral continues, 
notwithstanding debtor's bankruptcy. See United States v. Seeurity Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982); see also 
H.R. REP. No. 95-595 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963. 
'"II U.S.C. § 361 (1994) (stating ways in which adequate protection may be provided). See, e.g., Ford 
Motor Credit Co. v. JKJ Chevrolet, Inc. (In re JKJ Chevrolet, Inc.), No. 96-1836, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 
18180, at *5 (4th Cir. July 21. 1997) (noting adequate protection means creditor may not lose his interest in 
secured property). 
'"'II U.S.C. §§ 361(3), 1129(h)(2)(8)(1994). See also supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
151 See GROSS, supra note 24, at 101. 
152 See Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 18, at 618-35 (examining whether having secured claim 
necessarily results in satisfaction of that claim); Lupica, Circumvention, supra note 15, at 232--40 (discussing 
securitization with regard to third parties). 
m See Lupica, Circumvention, supra note 15, at 232-40 (noting unsecured creditors are in difficult 
position because oftype ofassets included in estate). 
154 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing credit rating agencies). 
m Jonathan E. Keighley. Risks in Securitization Transactions, in THE GLOBAL ASSET BACKED 
SECURJTIES MARKET 100 (Charles Stone et al. eds. 1993). 
'" Jd at 100-01. 
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receivables not falling within these parameters will not be included in the pool. 157 
What will remain in the originator's hands will be the lower quality assets - those 
with a higher probability of default. These will be the assets in the event of 
originator's bankruptcy, that. will be available for the benefit of the originator's 
unsecured creditors. The inevitable result of the securitization is a diminution of the 
quality profile of the firm's asset pool. 158 
While the revisions to Article 9 impacting securitization have provided the 
guidance and certainty pressed for by securitization transaction participants, time 
and experience will reveal the prescience of the academics who have been urging 
caution with respect to such drastic revisions. Business reorganizations cannot be 
accomplished in the absence of cash, and if ABS investors monopolize debtor's 
post-petition cash flow, the interests of the debtor, as well as the interests of the 
debtor's other creditors, employees and suppliers will be compromised. This is 
perhaps an effect upon the bankruptcy dynamic not fully contemplated or 
appreciated by the drafters of Revised Article 9. 
VI. BANKRUPTCY CODE AMENDMENT TO THE DEFINITION OF "ESTATE" 
On January 30, 2001, Senator Grassley159 and Congressman Gekas 160 each 
introduced a bill entitled, The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
!S7 Jd 
158 Moreover, it is often the case that an originator securitizes its assets with the greatest potential to 
increase in value. If the securitized assets do appreciate, it is the asset-backed security purchasers that get the 
benefit of the increased value, not the debtor and its creditors, as would be the case in a secured financing. 
Further, if a firm uses an asset to secure a borrowing, the borrower retains the use and possession of the 
collateral, as well as the proceeds of the loan. The retention, use and possession of collateral has value -- and 
this value is lost if a third party carries the collateral away. This additional value is typically reflected in the 
difference betWeen the amount of the secured loan (which iS the measure of the secured creditor's property 
interest in the collateral) and the (preswnably greater) value of the collateral. The value retained may have 
the effect of feducing the risk of default to other creditors. Moreover, debtor's other Creditors may require 
that the debtor retain its valuable assets on its balance sheet, or they may merely be psychologically 
comfoned by the debtor's continuing retention of title in the asset, notwithstanding the fact that they likely 
have no access to it However, secured creditors do lose their priority, because the expiration ofpedection or 
faulty perfection, and in such cases, the collateral returns to the general asset pool, available for distribution 
to the general unsecured creditors in the event of debtor's bankruptcy. The relationship that develops 
between a secured lender and a debtor may be very important to the continued existence of the debtor in yet 
another way. If for example, a debtor's account debtors are unable to meet its contractual repayment terms, 
debtor has the option of offering these account debtor customers some flexibility in payment, by in tum 
negotiating a concession with its secured lender. Such flexibility may be necessary to sustain the customer 
relationship and work through troubled accounts. Flexibility may be in the form of an increased credit line, 
lower interest rnte, longer tenn, or waiver of some requirement of the credit. In the absence of this 
flexibility, the relationship the fll'ID has with its accoWlt debtor customers may be compromised. This may 
adversely impact the company's business in general, thus hurting the company's other creditors. See Lupica, 
Asset Securitization, supra note 18, at 616-31. 
139 Senator Chuck Grassley is a Republican Senator from Iowa. Information on Senator Grassley is 
available at http://www.senate.gov.grasstey. 
160 Congressman George W. Gekas is a Republican Congressman for the 17th District of Pennsylvania. 
Information on Congressman Gekas is available at http://www.house.gov/gekas. 
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Protection Act of 200 I, in their respective Congressional chambers. 161 Both 
sponsors have vowed to act quickly to see that the bill becomes law. 162 The vast 
majority of the proposed changes to the Bankruptcy Code are targeted at consumer 
debtors and the consumer bankruptcy process. 163 There are, however, a number of 
proposals designed to affect business bankruptcies164 and among these proposals is 
a redefmtion of the term "estate." 165 The proposed amendment to section 541 of the 
161 These bills are identical to the final conference report approved at the end of the 106th Congress 
(passed by both houses of Congress, but pocket-vetoed by President Clinton in the last days of his 
presidency) and substantially similar to the Bankruptcy Refonn Act of 1999, which also failed to become 
law. See Grass/ey Continues Effort to Overhaul Bankruptcy System, Congressional Press Releases, Jan. 31, 
2001, available at http://Www.senate.gov/-grassley/releases/2001/pOJJJ-31.htm; 147 Cong. Rec. HI33 
(daily ed. Jan. 31 , 200I) [hereinafter Gekas] (statement of Congressman Gekas concerning Congressional 
Record, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001), available at 
hnp://www.abiworld.org/hr333.htntl. 
162 Gekas supra note 161, at HI33 ("[11he purpose of the special order to which I am attached today is to 
announce the introduction of the new bankruptcy refonn act that we hope will be enacted into law during 
this current session and swiftly to arrive at the President's desk for signature."). 
HSJ As announced by Congressman Gekas: 

So we never lose sight of, nor will we ever lost sight of, the real purpose of bankruptcy 

reform or any bankruptcy legislation to allow an American citizen the right to gain a 

fresh start after finding himself incapable of meeting his obligations. But the other 

tandem theme that is also part of what we have been doing for the last 3 years, and 

which will be an important feature of the new bill. will be that certain provisions will 

be put into place which will make certain that those people who have an ability to repay 

some of their debts will be compelled to do so, so that instead of a chapter 7 filing 

which will give that automatic almost-fresh start, we will be able to shepherd some of 

the debtors into chapter 13 and propose a plan and adopt a plan by which they could 

over a period of time repay some of the debt out of their then-current earnings. 

ld. See also Dissenting Views, available at http:l/www.house.gov/judiciary_democratslbankruptcydissent 
views.htm (citing Professor Elizabeth Warren's March 11, 1999 Written Statement, the bill "has more than 
120 pages of amendments affecting consumer cases. and they all head in the same direction; They give a 
fewer cr;editor interests more opportunities to try to recover from their debtocs while they reduce the 
protection for other creditors and debtors."). 
164 The bankruptcy bill proposes a number of significant changes to the rules affecting business 
bankruptcies. These changes include: (i) an extension of the time for debtor's assumption or rejection of 
nonresidential leases; (ii) a modification of the test to determine whether a transfer in the ordinary course of 
business qualifies as an exception to the rule against preferential transfers; (iii) a change in the venue rule for 
commencing preference actions; (iv) an extension of the period for filing a plan under chapter 11; (v) a 
modification of the "disinterestedness" standard for bankruptcy professionals; (vi) a modification of the rules 
for small business bankruptcies; and (vii) changes to certain bankruptcy tax provisions, and changes to the 
rules affecting single-asset real estate cases. See generally Dan Morgan & Kathleen Day. Early Wins 
Embolden Lobbyist for Business; Groups to Push Much Broader Agenda, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 11, 
200 I, at AOI (stating that pro-business are dusting off dozens of long-stalled legislative proposals). 
165 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994) reads in part: 
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301,302 or 303 of this title creates an 
estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by 
whomever held: 
(I) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal 
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of 
the case. 
ld 
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Bankruptcy Code excludes from a debtor's "estate" assets transferred in a 
• • . • 166
secunttzatton transactton. 
166 Section 912 ofThe Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of2001 (Introduced in 
the House on Jan. 30, 200 I) reads: 
SEC. 912. ASSET-BACKED SECURJTIZATIONS. 
Section 541 of title 11, United States Code, is amended-­
(!) in subsection (b), by inserting after paragraph (7), as added by this Act, the 
following: 
(8) any eligible asset (or proceeds thereof), to the extent that such eligible 
asset was transferred by the debtor, before the date of commencement of the 
case, to an eligible entity in connection with an asset-backed securitization, 
except to the extent such asset (or proceeds or value thereof) may be 
recovered by the trustee under section 550 by virtue of avoidance under 
section 548(a); and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: 
(f) For purposes of this section­
( I) The tenn 'asset-backed securitization' means a transaction in which 
eligible assets transferred to an eligible entity are used as the source of 
payment on securities, including. without limitation, all securities issued by 
governmental units, at least one class or tranche of which was rated 
investment grade by one or more nationally recognized securities rating 
organizations, when the securities were initially issued by an issuer; 
(2) The tenn 'eligible asset' means-­
(A) financial assets (including interests therein and proceeds 
thereof), either fixed or revolving. whether or not the same are in 
existence as of the date of the transfer, including residential and 
commercial mortgage loans, consumer receivables, trade 
receivables, assets of governmental units, including payment 
obligations relating to taxes, receipts, fines, tickets, and other 
sources of revenue, and lease receivables, that, by their terms, 
convert into cash within a finite time period, plus any residual 
interest in property subject to receivables included in such 
financing assets plus any rights or other assets designed to assure 
the servicing or timely distribution of proceeds to security holders; 
(B) cash; and 
(C) securities, including, without limitation, all securities issued 
by governmental units; · 
(3) The tenn 'eligible entity' means-­
(A) an issuer; or 
(B) a trust, corporation, partnership, governmental unit, limited 
liability company (including a single member limited liability 
company), or other entity engaged exclusively in the business of 
acquiring and transferring eligible assets directly or indirectly to 
an issuer and taking actions ancillary thereto; 
(4) The term 'issuer' means a trust, corporation, partnership, or other entity 
engaged exclusively in the business of acquiring and holding eligible assets, 
issuing securities backed by eligible assets, and taking actions ancillary 
thereto; and 
(5) The term 'transferred' means, the debtor, under a written agreement, 
represented and warranted that eligible assets were sold, contributed, or 
otherwise conveyed with the intention of removing them from the estate of 
the debtor pursuant to subsection (b)(8) (whether or not reference is made to 
this title or any section hereof), irrespective and without limitation of-­
(A) whether the debtor directly or indirectly obtained or held an 
interest in th.e issuer or in any securities issued by the issuer; 
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Notwithstanding the fact that it was referred to in the Congressional Record 
reference as a "clarification,'" 67 and in Congressional testimony as "in the nature of 
[a] technical correction[]," 168 this amendment to the Bankruptcy Code, if enacted, 
will fundamentally alter the essence of business bankruptcy .169 The redefinition of 
"estate" will remove from the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, "eligible 
assets"170 transferred by the debtor to an "eligible entity in connection with an asset­
backed securitization."m "Eligible assets" are defined to include commonly 
securitized receivables. 172 
(B) whether the debtor had an obligation to repurchase or to 
service or supervise the servicing of all or any portion of such 
eligible assets; or 
(C) the characterization of such sale, contribution, or other 
conveyance for tax, accounting, regulatory reponing, or other 
purposes. 
H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Asset-Backed Securitization], available at http://thomas.loc.gov/. 
167 Gekas, supra note 161, at Hl34 ("It also clarifies the treatment of certain financial contracts under the 
banking laws as well as under the Bankruptcy Code."). See generally Christian A. Johnson, Derhlatives and 
Rehypothecation Failure: It's 3:00p.m., Do You Know Where Your Collateral Is?, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 949, 
953 (1997) (defining financial contract as value depending on one or more underlying assets or indexes of 
asset values). 
168 Grosshandler Statement, supra note SI, at 185 ("These proposed changes should not raise sweeping 
new policy issues - they are entirely consistent with many statutory provision that have already been 
enacted, and are in the natme of technical corrections."). 
169 
"This section would allow many transactions to be structured so that in the event of bankruptcy no cash 
collateral would be available for funding a reorganization or repaying unsecured creditors. This is because of 
the overly broad definition which treats many secured loans as asset transfers, which in tum would remove 
those assets from property of the bankrupt's estate. Removal of such assets from the estate will virtually 
ensure a shortage of cash, and thereby create a crisis for many troubled businesses whose receivables 
represent the only sources of liquidity. Because this provision represents a departure from the federal policy 
of favoring reorganizations over the liquidation of viable business enterprises, the League opposes this 
provision." Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part III): Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the Subcomm. on 
Commercial & Admin. Law, 106th Cong. 95 (1999) [herei.nafter Miller Testimony] (testimony of Judith 
Greenstone Miller on behalf of The Commercial Law League of America), available at 
htw.;//www.house.gov/judiciary/1 06-gree.htm. 
See Asset·Backed Securitization, supra note 166. 

111/d 

172 Receivables, including credit card receivables, intellectual property licenses, cash and securities are all 
deemed to be "eligible" for purposes of this provision. See id. Furthennore, the defmition of "asset 
securitization" in the amendment does not exclude all securitized assets form the originator's bankruptcy 
estate- simply those assets that are transferred and result in the issuance of securities rated investment grade 
or better by a nationally·recognized statistical rating organization. This limits the "carve out" from the 
definition of "estate" to public offerings and rated private issuances. Excepted from this exception are 
unrated assets securitized in private issuances. As described by one observer, "This [provision] is 
wonderfully tailored to favor Wall Street over other sources of debt capital. . · .. [T]here is no rational basis 
for distinguishing amongst sources of debt capital based upon whether it results in the issUance of a [mted] 
'security.'" Corrunents of Kenneth Kettering, Partner. Reed. Smith, Shaw & McCay (June 21. 1999) (on file 
with Author). See also Testimony of Ann Stem, CEO, Financial Guarantee Insurance Corporation, Federal 
Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, (May 19, 1998) [hereinafter, Stern Testimony](stating 
application of proposed amendment is limited to "investment grade securities substantially reduc[ing] the 
possibility that a lender or its operating company could transfer some or all of its loan assets or other 
receivables to a bankruptcy remote entity in an effort to defraud creditors of the company"). · 
319 2001] ~CU&TI~TIONTMN~CTIONS 
This provlSlon is a dramatic change in the law defining estate property. 173 
Historically, the Bankruptcy Code has relied upon non-bankruptcy law to define 
property interests under the Code. 174 When what is at issue is whether a transfer of 
Article 9 assets are properly included in the transferee's bankruptcy estate, the 
question of the nature of the transfer, as well as the steps needed to be taken to 
establish the transferee's property rights, have always been state-law determined. 
As noted above, the question of whether an asset transfer is a sale or a transfer 
of collateral for a loan is an equitable determination to be made under state common 
law. 175 Moreover, Article 9 outlines the steps necessary to protect "security interest" 
transfers against competing creditor claims. These transfers must be "perfected" ­
which in the case of an account, means the filing of a proper financing statement 
covering the transferred account. Under Article 9, this filing is required for the 
protection of creditors, even if the transfer is in the nature of a true sale. Revised 
section 9-317(a), 176 read in concert with section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 177 
gives the trustee in bankruptcy the power to defeat the interest of an unperfected 
transferee of an account, whether the transfer is intended for security or is in the 
nature of an absolute sale. 
Securitized assets ("eligible assets") are carved out of the definition of the 
"estate" in a manner that changes the basic premise of state law under Article 9. 
First, the proposed amendment federalizes the issue of whether a transfer of assets 
is a sale, or a collateral transfer. Notwithstanding an objectively determined 
characterization of the transfer, 178 if the parties represent in writing that a sale was 
173 The property that constitutes a debtor's bankruptcy estate is at the center of the bankruptcy process. 
Property of the estate is used to satisfy creditor claims, it may be used, sold, leased, or borrowed against, and 
may be required lobe rerumed to the estate if in the bands of third parties. II U.S.C. § 704(1) (1994) (trustee 
has the power to ''collect and reduce to money the property of the estate"); id. § 726 (1994) (outlining the 
scheme for the distribution of property of the estate); id 1129 (1994) (describing how property of the estate 
used in connection with plan of reorganization); id § 363(b)(l), (c)(!) (1994) (property of the estate must be 
used, sold or leased); id. § 364(c)(2)-{3), (d)( I) (1994) (debtor's borrowing secured by property of the 
estate); id. § 542(a) (1994) (authorizing the tnistee to demand return of "property that the trustee may use, 
sell or lease under § 363"); id. §§ 362(a)(2)-{4), 364(d) ( 1994). Of course, a secured party whose collateral 
is being used by a reorganizing debtor must be offered "adequate protection" of its interest. In addition, the 
Code's automatic stay precludes actions taken with respect to property of the estate. For a debtor 
rehabilitating its business under chapter 11, property of the estate necessary to the reorganization may be 
used by the debtor, notwithstanding a secured parties' state law created interest. The corollary to this rule 
designed to encourage the reorganization of viable businesses is that debtor may not use non-estate property 
to reorganize. 
174 The debtor's estate, as defined under§ 54l(a) is comprised of "interests of the debtor in property." II 
U.S.C. § 541(a)(l994). 
175 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (distinguishing between asset transfer as sale or 
transfer). 
176 Rev. U.C.C. § 9-3l7(a) (stating that unperfected secured creditor's interest is vulnerable to defeat by 
lien creditor). · 
177 II U.S. C. § 544(a) (1994) (granting trustee status of hypothetical judicial lien creditor and bona fide 
purchaser of real propeny with rights in property superior to those of creditors with unperfected security 
interests). 
178 Jd See Lupica, Circumvemion, supra note 15, at 213 (observing that characterization of asset transfer 
as either "true sale" or secured loan is determined by court after considering variety of factors, and that 
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intended, the transfer is deemed a sale under federal law .179 As observed by 
Professor Kenneth N. K.lee in his testimony before the Judiciary Committee: 
[R]ating agencies and private parties [should not be authorized] to 
make the legal detennination of whether an asset is property of a 
bankruptcy estate. [This provision also impedes on states' rights.] 
Transactions that are not sales under state law should not be treated 
as sales by federal bankruptcy law to the detriment of the estate and 
unsecured creditors. 180 
Moreover, under the proposed amendment, if the assets at issue fall within the 
definition of "eligible assets" 181 and the "transfer"182 is made to an "eligible 
entity" 183 "in connection with an asset-backed securitization,"184 then, 
notwithstanding the absence of Article 9-required perfection of the transfer (the 
absence of a properly filed financing statement), the bankruptcy trustee has no 
power under 544(a) to defeat the transferee's interest. 185 Likewise, the transfer may 
not be recovered for the benefit of the estate as a preferential transfer, nor as a state­
law fraudulent conveyance. 186 The only avoidance power that can be exercised to · 
recapture these "eligible assets" is the trustee's power to avoid fraudulent transfers 
transferee deemed to be secured lender is considered "party in interest" to debtor's bankruptcy, and therefore, 
sub~ect to diminution ofrights and priority). 
1 See Asset-Backed Securitization, supra note 166 (defining term "transferred"). 
180 Klce Testimony, supra note 25, at 105. 
111 See Asset-Backed Securization, supra note 166 (defining term "eligible assets" to include broad range 
of financial assets, cash and securities). 
182 Id (defining term "transferred"). 
183 Id. (defining term "eligible entity" to include issuers, and certain trusts, corporations, partnerships and 
limited liability companies). 
184 Jd (defining "asset-backed securitization"). 
185 In response to an observation by my colleague Professor Tom Ward, 
[I]t appears that the "bill go[es] much further than what is avowed in the legislative 
debates. By adding a new subsection to the list of exclusions in current section 541 (b) 
the new language carves securitized income streams (''eligible assets") out of the 
definition of property of the estate. ... the language of this federal exclusion also 
creates a single exception that allows the trustee to recover these otherwise excluded 
"eligible assets" under section 550 "by virtue of avoidance Wlder section 548(a)" ... 
The negative inference in the language seems to that these excluded "eligible assets" 
are beyond the reach of the trustee's other avoidance powers- including 544(a)(l) [if 
the transfer is not perfected] and 547 [if the transfer is preferential.] In other words, this 
narrow exception for limited avoidance built into the 541 (b) exclusion of these eligible 
asseiS seems to ttump the language in 541(a)(3) thai brings all asseiS recovered by the 
bUStee under any of the avoidance powers within the definition of "property of the 
estate." 
Professor Charles Tabb responded: "I share in your perplexity and astonishment. I think it is inarguable that 
lhe bill purports to do exactly what you describe. One ofmany bad, bad parts of a very bad bill." (CommeniS 
on file with Author). 
"'See supra id.; II U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994) (allowing for avoidance of certain transfers made upon eve of 
bankruptcy); id. § 544(b) (1994) (allowing trustee lo use potentially longer look-back period of slate 
fraudulent transfer law, provided there is actual creditor who could have avoided.transfer). 
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under section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 187 Allowing ABS transferees to 
escape the trustee's power to avoid unperfected transfers, preferential transfers, and 
transfers fraudulent under state Jaw certainly su~ests an impairment of established 
Bankruptcy Code rules, reorganization policies, 1 8 as well as of the rights of other 
creditors who rely upon the state Jaw public notice filing system. 
This amendment was lobbied for by the bond market, as well as by law firms 
concerned about their inability to offer unqualified true sale opinions.189 
Notwithstanding the assurances offered by some of the amendment's proponents, 190 
this provision tears at the fabric of established bankruptcy policy, 191 and is neither a 
187 See Asset~Backed Securization, supra note 166. 
(8) any eligible asset (or proceeds thereof), to the extend that such eligible asset was 
transferred by the debtor, before the date of commencement of the case, to an eligible 
entity in connection with an asset-backed securitization, except to the extent such assets 
(or proceeds or value thereof) may be recovered by the tnJ.stee under section 550 by 
reason ofavoidance under section 548(a); 
/d &emphasis added). 
18 See Stem Testimony, supra note J72. 

[The Association of Financial Guaranty Insurors] believes that the suggested 

revisions... relating to asset-backed securities reduces uncertainty under the 

Bankruptcy Code as it applies to the almost $200 billion per year of asset-backed 

securities issued in the United States. By reducing uncertainty, the proposed 

amendment will increase stability in the capital markets and thereby facilitate asset­

backed financings and eliminate certain risks which otherwise indirectly increase 

interest rates for millions of consumers, small business and others seeking financing 

from the capital markets. The proposed revision is constructed to achieve these benefits 

without impairing any of the reorganization and fairness policies underlying the 

Bankruptcy Code. 

/d.
119 Commenting to Professor Thomas Ward, Professor Kenneth K.lee stated: 

The language was lobbied in by FSA, the NY bond rating agency that rates securitized 

paper and by the NY law firms who have written true sale opinioos. They are wonied 

about liability for their questionable ratings. The intent of section 912 is to exclude 

assets from the Cs:tate notwithstanding that they may be a financing transaction (rather 

than a true sale) under state law. This is one of the worst provisions of the bill and will 

apply retroactively" 

Comments of Professor Kenneth Klee to Professor Thomas Ward, Feb. 8, 2001 (on file with the Author). See 
also Testimony of David Warren, Managing Director of the Bond Market Association, March 25, 1999. 
In order to obtain sales treatment wtder the relevant accounting standards, participants 
in the mortgage-backed and asset-backed securitization transactions must obtain 
assurances from counsel that the sale of assets will be final under bankruptcy law. Such 
legal advice is referred to as a "true sale opinion." Unfortunately, there is a lack of 
guiding judicial precedent regarding what constitutes such a true sale of assets. The 
considerations in the analysis are highly subjective and depend on a qualitative 
assessment of a wide variety of facts and circumstances. For these and other reasons, 
any true sale will generally be a reasoned one, with various asswnptions as to factual 
matters and conclusions that introduce an unnecessary degree of legal uncertainty in the 
asset-backed market. As a result, for some types of transactions. true sale opinions can 
be extremely difficult, costly, and in a few cases, impossible to render." 
/d. 
190 See supra note 188. 
191 See supra note 188. 
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clarification of existing law, nor a technical correction. 192 It is a drastic change in 
bankruptcy Jaw and policy that will thwart the long-standing principle encouraging 
the reorganization of viable businesses. If this amendment is included in the 
version of the bankruptcy bill that eventually becomes Jaw, Congress will have 
succeeded in carving assets out of a debtor's estate that may be necessary to 
facilitate the debtor's reorganization and to pay priority claimants and unsecured 
creditors. These may be assets that the parties merely declare to be securitized ­
even if no state law property rights were established in the transferee and even if, 
under state law, the transfer is considered unperfected and thus vulnerable to 
creditors of the debtor, and in the absence of the special treatment provided these 
assets by this legislation, the trustee in bankruptcy. 193 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The revisions made to Article 9 of the U.C.C. affecting secunttzation 
transactions go a long way toward eliminating the uncertainty and ambiguity 
securitization transaction participants face under current law. The drafters of 
Revised Article 9 accurately identified the gaps and ambiguities in the law and 
made targeted changes addressing the vulnerabilities of securitization transaction 
participants. What is not reflected in Revised Article 9, however, are the concerns 
of those who believe that a further proliferation of securitization may have 
distributive consequences. One such consequence may be an increased risk of non­
payment in bankruptcy for unsecured creditors of securitizing originators. Another 
may be the diminished ability to reorganize, notwithstanding other factors 
positively suggesting the viability of reorganization, due to the Jack of cash 
collateraL 
The issue that the drafters of Revised Article 9 could not resolve - whether a 
securitized asset is definitively deemed included in a securitizing originator's 
bankruptcy estate -- was addressed by Congress in its attempted redefinition of 
bankruptcy estale. Congress, however, went further, in allowing trarisferees in 
securitization transactions to avoid the possibility that their transfer might be 
avoided, even ifpreferential, fraudulent under state Jaw, or unperfected. 
192 See supra notes 167-168. 
193 See ll U.S.C. § 544 (1994). 
